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 This thesis explores the development of a housing scheme in rural Pakistan. In the 
so-called ‘backward’ district of Bhakkar, five entrepreneurs formed a partnership in 2004 
to build the area’s first privately developed housing scheme. As housing schemes are 
associated with development in Pakistan, they saw themselves as providing services that 
the state was expected, but failed, to deliver. 
 Departing from normative conceptions of the state, I argue that this case study 
demonstrates how state power functions in Pakistan. Though it is an entrepreneurial 
venture, the construction of the housing scheme is structured by a discourse of national 
development. Further, the project was made possible through the state’s integration of 
Bhakkar into global economic circuits. The Pakistani state’s power in this instance does 
not obtain from its felt presence in Bhakkar but rather from its assurance of access to 
various physical and digital networks through which it is reconfigured. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  v 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
 
NAME OF AUTHOR:  Tariq L. Rahman 
 
 
GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED: 
 University of Oregon, Eugene 
 Arizona State University, Tempe 
  
  
DEGREES AWARDED: 
 Master of Arts, International Studies, 2016, University of Oregon 
 Bachelor of Arts, Political Science, 2009, Arizona State University 
  
  
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST: 
 Pakistan 
 Anthropology of the state 
 Urban planning 
 Infrastructure 
 Markets and entrepreneurs 
 Land and property 
 Urban marginality and resistance 
 
 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: 
 Graduate Teaching Fellow, Department of International Studies, University of  
       Oregon, 2013-2015 
 
 
GRANTS, AWARDS, AND HONORS: 
  
Domestic Travel Grant, American Institute of Pakistani Studies, 2015 
 Research Interest Group Basic Support Grant, Center for the Study of Women and 
Society, University of Oregon, 2015 
 
 Thurber Award, Department of International Studies, University of Oregon, 2014 
 
 Slape Award, Department of International Studies, University of Oregon, 2014 
 
 Promising Scholar Award, Graduate School, University of Oregon, 2012 
 
  vi 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 First and foremost, I am grateful to this project itself for the people, experiences, 
and growth it has brought into my life. It has been both the most challenging and 
fulfilling journey thus far, and despite how tired I am as I near the end of it, there’s 
nothing I look forward to more than the next one. Following from that, I am indebted to 
Anita Weiss for her intellectual and professional mentorship over the past several years, 
without which I would likely still be searching for the direction that working with her has 
given me. With that said, the other members of my committee, Arafaat Valiani and Philip 
Scher, have been crucial sources of support at every juncture of this study. Undoubtedly, 
without the ideas I was introduced to in their thoughtfully planned and always 
exhilarating classes, this project would not have taken the path that it did, and the 
guidance as well as freedom they have granted me as mentors has allowed it to become 
something that I am just as proud of as I am passionate about. I am deeply thankful to the 
people who made this project possible during my time in Pakistan. I am still touched by 
the generosity I received, by family and strangers alike, over the course of my field work, 
as well as the stories that inspired, entertained, and shook me, many of which did not find 
their way into this thesis. This project, like everything before and after it, would not have 
been possible without the unabating support of my Mom, who has been with me through 
every success and failure, and I can only hope to have made proud, as that is all she has 
ever asked for in return. Lastly, thank you Sarah, for being a soul-mate, for your enduring 
patience, understanding, and love, which has steadied me as well as guided me through 
our own journey.  
  vii 
 
 
 
 
For my father and his father 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  viii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter Page 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1 
 A ‘Failed’ State? .................................................................................................... 2 
 Theorizing the Pakistani State ............................................................................... 5 
 
 The Developmental State ....................................................................................... 9 
 
 Summary of Chapters ............................................................................................ 14 
 Methodology .......................................................................................................... 15 
II. ENTREPRENEURIALISM, HOUSING, AND DEVELOPMENT IN 
     PAKISTAN ............................................................................................................. 21 
 Housing Schemes and Development ..................................................................... 24 
 Cooperative Housing Societies .............................................................................. 25 
 Development Authorities ....................................................................................... 28 
 The Private Sector .................................................................................................. 31 
 The Informal Sector ............................................................................................... 33 
 A Bribe and the State ............................................................................................. 36 
 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 39 
III. ENABLING DEVELOPMENT IN BHAKKAR ................................................... 41 
 The Global Economy and Real Estate in Pakistan ................................................. 42 
 A ‘Backward’ Area ................................................................................................ 46 
 Enabling Development in Bhakkar ........................................................................ 51 
 Building Gulshan-e-Madina ................................................................................... 53 
 
  ix 
Chapter Page 
 
 
 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 61 
IV. COUNTER-CONDUCT IN THE MOHALLAS .................................................... 63 
 Counter-Conduct and Resistance ........................................................................... 65 
 Development and Its Limits ................................................................................... 67 
 Contending Discourses of Development ............................................................... 68 
 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 71 
V. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 72 
A Genealogy of Housing Schemes ........................................................................ 74 
REFERENCES CITED ................................................................................................ 76 
  
  x 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure Page 
 
 
1.   Gulberg Islamabad master plan ............................................................................. 22 
 
2. LDA City newspaper advertisement ...................................................................... 30 
 
3. Islamabad’s master plan ......................................................................................... 48 
4. Population density map of Bhakkar City ............................................................... 50 
5. Mohalla in Bhakkar City ....................................................................................... 52 
6. Gulshan-e-Madina’s master plan ........................................................................... 54 
7. Gulshan-e-Madina’s main entrance gate ............................................................... 57 
8. Gulshan-e-Madina’s park ....................................................................................... 58 
9. House designed by Youssef ................................................................................... 60 
10. Kothi built in a mohalla in Bhakkar City ............................................................... 69 
 
  1 
CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“There is no government here,” Hafiz told me while navigating his Toyota 
Corolla through the dirt roads of Darya Khan, a small town in the rural district of 
Bhakkar. He explained that when Pakistan was decimated by floods in 2010, which 
affected more than 5,000 households and 60,000 people in Bhakkar alone,1 nobody came. 
“Maybe one NGO,” he said, squinting and waving his hand, implying the insignificance 
of such efforts. Rather, Hafiz claimed, it was well-off locals like himself that had 
distributed the resources necessary for the area’s survival and eventual recovery. 
Bhakkar is located in southern Punjab, and as the district lags behind most others 
in the province in terms of development indicators, it is generally viewed as a ‘backward’ 
area. Over the course of my fieldwork in Bhakkar, I became interested in local residents 
providing services that the state was expected, but failed to deliver; these situations were 
rampant in Bhakkar and ranged from hospitals funded by zakat (obligatory alms-giving in 
Islam) to personal bodyguards. But for me, the most intriguing example was a housing 
scheme developed in the district’s capital, Bhakkar City,2 by Hafiz and four other men. 
The Gulshan-e-Madina housing scheme is master planned, features modern construction 
and amenities, is surrounded by a boundary wall, and stands in stark contrast to much of 
the rest of its surrounding built environment. In these ways, Gulshan-e-Madina resembles 
housing schemes that have proliferated in Pakistan since the country’s independence and 
                                                
1 UNOCHA, Pakistan Floods 2010 – Bhakkar District Profile, 2011. 
 
2 For the sake of both clarity and consistency with my contacts, I use ‘Bhakkar’ to refer to Bhakkar District 
and ‘the city’ to refer Bhakkar City, with the exception of the times that I refer to these localities by their 
proper names.  
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are part and parcel of national development. That is to say, while the efforts of Hafiz and 
his partners might appear to be beyond or even against the state, I view them as 
nevertheless contributing to state power.  
In this thesis, I explore how development, and accordingly Pakistani state 
formation occurs in the rural, ‘backward’ district of Bhakkar. Essential to the 
development of Gulshan-e-Madina, I show, has been Bhakkar’s connectivity to national 
and regional metropolitan hubs through paved roads, the Internet, passports, visas, and 
remittance channels, all of which have been made available by the state. I argue that the 
Pakistani state’s power in this instance does not obtain from its felt presence in Bhakkar, 
but its assurance of access to economic circuits through which private entrepreneurs such 
as Hafiz contribute to national development. 
 
A ‘Failed’ State? 
It has been challenging not to allow this project to slip into a narrative of a ‘failed’ 
state. After all, ‘failure’ is a label often applied to the Pakistani state, perhaps most 
notably by Fund for Peace’s annually published Failed States Index, which has ranked 
Pakistan in its top 15 every year since 2006.3 The report’s view of ‘failure’ includes not 
only the wholesale collapse of the state, but also the state’s inability to collect taxes, 
make collective decisions, and distribute public services. Seemingly confirming this 
characterization in my case study, the greater role of the private sector brought about by 
                                                
3 Due to the increasing contentiousness over the term ‘failed,’ the Failed States Index changed its name to 
the Fragile States Index in 2014.  
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the increasing intensity of the global economy has been associated with the ‘retreat,’ 
‘decline,’ and ‘erosion’ of the state in developing countries.4  
However, as Joel Migdal  and Klaus Schlichte have explained, evaluations of state 
‘strength’ and ‘failure’ depend upon normative ideas about what states ‘should’ be.5 Such 
ideas are informed by Max Weber’s conception of an ideal-type state, which he 
understood as a unitary and autonomous actor that regulates a state’s territory as well as 
those who inhabit that territory. Unfortunately, this rigid approach to the state obscures 
the rich negotiation, interaction, and resistance through which statehood is often 
produced. Moreover, it privileges a European experience of history, thereby ignoring the 
differing world-historical conditions in which states emerge. Thus, the hierarchical 
difference between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ states maps onto a West/non-West divide. It is 
worthwhile to quote Migdal and Schlichte at length here: 
Variation [between states] can be conceptualized and measured only as distance 
from the ideal-type. As long as the idea of the state is uniform and constant, the 
variation of states, even the failure of some states, can be expressed only in terms 
of deviation from the standard. If real states fell short of the standard, as they 
were bound to do, all sorts of words had to be invented to express the gap 
between actual practice and the ideal. Terms, such as quasi-states, soft states, 
shadow states, weak states, non-state states, decay, corruption, weakness, and 
relative capacity, all implied that the way things really work are somehow 
exogenous to the normative model of what the state and its relations to society 
are, or should be. Comparison comes in specifying and measuring deviation from 
the norm or the ideal-type. State capacity can be gauged against a measuring stick 
whose endpoint is a variant of Weber's ideal-type of the modern rational state. For 
non-European states, the danger is that the one measure, the ideal-type state 
drawn from European experience, creates a hierarchy in which those farthest from 
the ideal-type are lowest on the hierarchy.6  
                                                
4 Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
 
5 Joel S. Migdal and Klaus Schlichte, “Rethinking the State,” in The Dynamics of States: The Formation 
and Crises of State Domination, ed. Joel S. Migdal and Klaus Schlichte (Aldershot, Hants; Burlington: 
Ashgate, 2005). 
 
6 Ibid., 11.  
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The challenge for Migdal and Schlichte, then, is to view the state beyond this essentialist 
approach and attempt to understand “the way things really work.” This entails following 
the practices through which state formation occurs, whether they trace back to the formal 
institutions of the state or elsewhere. 
 While much of the current literature on the Pakistani state has complicated the 
notion of ‘failure,’ it nevertheless retains the term’s normative foundation. Ayesha Jalal’s 
The Struggle for Pakistan attributes the lack of development provided by the Pakistani 
state to the domination of the state apparatus by non-elected institutions.7 The Struggle 
for Pakistan continues from Jalal’s seminal book, The State of Martial Rule,8 which 
documented the circumstances under which the military and the bureaucracy came to 
exercise control over the state between 1947-58, or Pakistan’s initial years of 
independence. In The Struggle for Pakistan, Jalal emphasizes how development in 
Pakistan has been compromised by the continuing influence of non-elected institutions 
over state institutions in the intervening years; rather than development, the state 
apparatus has been concentrated on benefiting the Pakistani ‘establishment.’ Similarly, 
Stephen Cohen’s The Idea of Pakistan strives to offer a more nuanced view of ‘failure’ 
by highlighting the tensions between the ideals that underlay the creation of Pakistan and 
the contemporary Pakistani state.9 Among these tensions are that Pakistan’s founder, 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, aspired for the state to provide basic services to its citizens, and 
yet state institutions have not lived up to this expectation. But while Jalal and Cohen 
                                                
7 Ayesha Jalal, The Struggle for Pakistan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014). 
 
8 Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
 
9 Stephen Philip Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2004). 
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situate their discussions of Pakistani state within rich historical contexts, their views of 
the state are nevertheless limited, as they derive from normative ideas of what the state 
‘should’ be. In other words, within their frameworks, numerous processes and practices 
that contribute to state formation in Pakistan are not considered as they are not carried out 
by the state apparatus.  
 
Theorizing the Pakistani State 
 An emphasis on practices follows from Michel Foucault’s call to view state power 
beyond simply the force deployed by the state apparatus. In Discipline & Punish,10 
Foucault studied the prison to show how disciplinary power was produced by a dispersed 
network situated across a range of institutions, including prisons, schools, hospitals, and 
factories. Responding to criticism that his genealogical approach did not address the role 
of the state, Foucault contended that his analytic could also be applied to study political 
sovereignty over society. In his lectures at the Collège de France from 1978-79,11 
Foucault explored the concept of ‘governmentality’ as a guideline for a genealogy of the 
modern state. Like the prison, Foucault argued that the nature of the institution of the 
state is a function of broader changes in rationality, rather than the converse.12  
 As Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta have explained, governmentality provides 
a useful approach for distinguishing state power from the state apparatus: 
                                                
10 Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977). 
 
11 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978, ed. 
Michel Senellart et al. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
 
12 Colin Gordon, “Governmental Rationality: An Introduction,” in The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Governmentality, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (University of Chicago Press, 
1991). 
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[G]overnmentality enables us to unhinge rule from the “body” of the state by 
enlarging the space of governance. Instead of assuming that states are the supreme 
“holders” of power and deploy that power exclusively to dominate and rule, 
governmentality offers a lens to understand how power is exercised in society 
through varied social relations, institutions, and “bodies” that do not automatically 
fit under the rubric of “the state.”13 
 
Following from a Foucauldian analysis, many scholars have examined the 
mundane practices that produce ‘state effects,’ or the appearance of the state as a discrete 
and autonomous actor. For example, Timothy Mitchell has observed how the presentation 
of the law as an abstract code applied to society reifies the artificial border between state 
and society,14 and Gupta has explored how media representations construct an image of a 
benevolent state.15 Such projects locate state power in the representation of the state as a 
bounded institution that manages society, which they track through everyday practices.  
Others focusing on the state, however, while maintaining an emphasis on 
practices, have departed somewhat from Foucault’s power/knowledge paradigm. For 
instance, Nikhil Anand has described the unstable process behind state formation in 
Mumbai through the city’s water network.16 Anand approaches the state not as an effect 
produced by material practices, but as produced and reproduced materially through the 
constant work of the plumbers, politicians, engineers, and residents who manage 
                                                
13 Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta, “Introduction,” in The Anthropology of the State: A Reader, ed. 
Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta (Malden; Oxford: Blackwell, 2006): 25. 
 
14 Timothy Mitchell, “Society, Economy, and the State Effect,” in State/Culture: State-Formation after the 
Cultural Turn (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1999). 
 
15 Akhil Gupta, “Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of Politics, and the 
Imagined State,” American Ethnologist 22, no. 2 (1995). 
 
16 Nikhil Anand, “PRESSURE: The PoliTechnics of Water Supply in Mumbai,” Cultural Anthropology 26, 
no. 4 (2011).; Nikhil Anand, “Leaky States: Water Audits, Ignorance, and the Politics of Infrastructure,” 
Public Culture 27, no. 2 (2015). 
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Mumbai’s water flows. In other words, his work illuminates the heterogeneity of the state 
by highlighting the range of actors involved in the delivery of state services.  
Anand’s approach indicates an alternative entry-point to engaging the Pakistani 
state through practices. As indicated by Hafiz’s comment that there is “no government” 
in Bhakkar, tracking the construction of a coherent and all-powerful state in Pakistan 
seems ill-fitting. But this does not mean that the question of the state should be relegated 
to ‘failure’ or thrown out altogether. Indeed, retaining an emphasis on practices, recent 
work on the Pakistani state has sought to understand how what is conventionally viewed 
as ‘crisis’ is part and parcel of state formation.17 In Matthew Hull’s ethnography of 
bureaucracy in Islamabad,18 he shows how tools of governance, such as maps, files, lists, 
and surveys, are jointly produced by the state and the society that it purportedly regulates. 
But rather than linking these blurred boundaries between state and society to state 
‘failure,’ Hull argues that they are precisely the mechanism through which state rule 
functions in Pakistan. Similarly, in Nausheen Anwar’s study of infrastructure in the 
Punjab province,19 she notes the dependence of infrastructure provision on state-firm 
collaborations. While this has lead to the state being perceived as largely absent in 
infrastructure provision, and thus ‘failed,’ Anwar argues that the state is simply 
reconfigured through these Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). For both Hull and Anwar, 
the Pakistani state is conceptualized neither through the power deployed by the state 
                                                
17 Naveeda Khan, “Introduction,” in Beyond Crisis: Re-Evaluating Pakistan (London; New York: 
Routledge, 2010). 
 
18 Matthew S Hull, Government of Paper: The Materiality of Bureaucracy in Urban Pakistan (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2012). 
 
19 Nausheen H. Anwar, Infrastructure Redux: Crisis, Progress in Industrial Pakistan & Beyond 
(Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
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apparatus nor state effects; by tracking mundane practices of government, they attempt to 
better understand, as Migdal and Schlichte put it, “the way things really work.” 
 This thesis seeks to augment Hull’s and Anwar’s work by considering how state 
formation in Pakistan is not necessarily tied to state institutions. While their projects 
explore how the state is co-constituted by the state apparatus and society, I am interested 
in how private entrepreneurial efforts contribute to state formation. This approach follows 
from Béatrice Hibou’s interest in the ‘privatization of the state.’20 By this, Hibou is 
referring not to the the takeover of the public sphere by the private sphere, but “the 
spread of use of private intermediaries for an increasing number of functions formerly 
devolving on the state, and the redeployment of the state.”21 In other words, the 
privatization of the state refers to the increasing use of private intermediaries for 
governing and the new outlines of the state established by these practices. As Hibou 
explains, “if one considers that the points of state intervention can extend beyond 
institutions and that the question of sovereignty is distinct from that of state power, the 
appearance of those actors, flows and powers apparently competing with the state can be 
considered as points . . . of state intervention.”22 Thus, to use examples from Hibou’s 
work in sub-Saharan Africa, that private domestic and foreign companies have taken on 
responsibility for customs services, tax collection, and the regulation of maritime borders 
does not suggest the state’s loss of control, but simply the indirect exercise of 
administrative functions. As these actors perform state functions, new outlines of the state 
                                                
20 Béatrice Hibou, ed., Privatizing the State (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). 
 
21 Béatrice Hibou, “Preface to the English Edition,” in Privatizing the State, ed. Béatrice Hibou (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2004): viii. 
 
22 Béatrice Hibou, “From Privatising the Economy to Privatising the State: An Analysis of the Contual 
Formation of the State,” in Privatizing the State, ed. Béatrice Hibou (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2004): 23. 
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are drawn. This lack of institutional and geographical fixity of the state requires looking 
beyond state institutions and to statelike processes and practices in order to understand 
state power.23 Returning to Gulshan-e-Madina, though the housing scheme is an instance 
of the private sector providing services that the state is expected, but fails to deliver, it is 
also part and parcel of the process of state formation in Pakistan.  
 
The Developmental State 
As Akhil Gupta has shown, development is a discourse that defined the 
experience of newly created postcolonial states following World War II. The era of 
global politics that recognized the formally equal status of formerly colonized territories 
occurred alongside an era in development discourse that created an inequal position for 
these newly independent states. In what Gupta calls the ‘postcolonial condition,’ the 
legitimacy of states became bound to a teleological discourse that differentiated 
developed from developing. For postcolonial states, this imperative to develop meant a 
national transition from tradition (stagnation, conventional tools and technologies, 
poverty, superstition, and disorder) to modernity (progress, science, high standards of 
living, rationality, and order). In other words, for postcolonial states, state action became 
defined as mobilizing the nation toward development.24 In this thesis, I view state power 
in Pakistan as inextricably linked to national development.  
Pakistan was created in 1947 with the end of British rule in India and the 
partitioning of the former colony into two independent states, Pakistan and India. An 
                                                
23 Michel-Rolph Trouillot, “The Anthropology of the State in the Age of Globalization: Close Encounters 
of the Deceptive Kind,” Current Anthropology 42, no. 1 (2001). 
 
24 Stein Sundstøl Eriksen, “‘State Failure’ in Theory and Practice: The Idea of the State and the 
Contradictions of State Formation,” Review of International Studies 37, no. 1 (2011).  
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overwhelming majority of development under colonial rule had been concentrated in the 
territory that became India,25 and Pakistan held only 17.5 percent of the financial assets, 
10 percent of the industrial base, and 7 percent of the employment facilities of the 
subcontinent.26 As early as 1948, it was clear that Pakistan was no exception to the 
postcolonial condition, with the state’s Statement of Industrial Policy calling for the 
harnessing of national resources to overcome the country’s “industrial backwardness.”27  
 Pakistan’s development aspirations were facilitated by funding and expertise from 
international aid agencies, including the World Bank, the Ford Foundation, and the 
Harvard Advisory Group (HAG). Proponents of modernization theory, these agencies 
favored state-led development through large injections of capital. Acquiring a 
commanding role in Pakistan’s path to development, they viewed the country as a “poster 
child for global development,” 28 whose success story would demonstrate the viability of 
modernization theory to the broader development community.29 
 The role of foreign experts became more pronounced in the 1960s following the 
1959 military coup that brought pro-Western General Ayub Khan to power. Ayub Khan’s 
rule from 1959-68 is referred to as the ‘Golden Age’ of development: Powered by foreign 
aid, Ayub Khan launched extensive agricultural and industrial development projects 
throughout the country, seeking to both intensify national development and consolidate 
                                                
25 Anita M. Weiss, “Introduction,” in Development Challenges Confronting Pakistan, ed. Anita M. Weiss 
and Saba Gul Khattak (Sterling: Kumarian Press, 2013). 
 
26 Jalal, The Struggle for Pakistan. 
 
27 Government of Pakistan, Statement of Industrial Policy (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 1948):1. 
 
28 Markus Daechsel, Islamabad and the Politics of International Development in Pakistan (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
 
29 Weiss, “Introduction.”  
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state power.30 However, though Ayub Khan’s rule produced considerable growth, it was 
also characterized by the exacerbation of socioeconomic inequality. Pushed by the HAG, 
Ayub Khan pursued a policy of ‘functional inequality,’ which diverted resources to a 
small base of industrialists rather than spreading them more broadly.31 Increasing social 
stratification lead to political unrest and Ayub Khan’s eventual resignation.  
 It was these policies, and their consequences, that contributed to the election of 
populist candidate Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1971.32 Head of the Pakistan People’s Party, 
Bhutto came to power on a socialist platform, promising to put an end to the inequality 
that characterized the development policies of the previous regime. While his government 
nationalized vital industries and instituted land reforms, these measures were aimed 
toward rewarding supporters and punishing opponents rather than comprehensive 
national development.33 Amidst popular protests, Bhutto was overthrown in Pakistan’s 
second military coup, which brought General Zia ul-Haq to power.  
 The post-nationalization phase of Pakistan’s history has been characterized by 
World Bank and IMF-led structural adjustment programs, resulting in growth primarily 
being sustained by foreign capital and remittances.34 Following Zia ul-Haq’s rule, this 
approach to development continued through civilian administrations from 1988-99, 
Pakistan’s third era of military rule under Pervez Musharaff from 1999-2008 and the 
                                                
30 Anita M. Weiss, Culture, Class, and Development in Pakistan: The Emergence of an Industrial 
Bourgeoisie in Punjab (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991). 
 
31 Anwar, Infrastructure Redux: Crisis, Progress in Industrial Pakistan & Beyond. 
 
32 S. Akbar Zaidi, Issues in Pakistan’s Economy (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
 
33 Anita M. Weiss, “Pakistan,” in Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, ed. Arjun 
Guneratne and Anita M. Weiss (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014). 
 
34 Anwar, Infrastructure Redux: Crisis, Progress in Industrial Pakistan & Beyond. 
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current democratic tenure. Over the course of these years, development in Pakistan 
increasingly came to rely upon private sector activities rather than state-led efforts.  
 But returning to Anwar’s argument, the rising role of the private sector in national 
development in Pakistan has reconfigured, rather than reduced state power. In her book, 
Anwar discusses how the Pakistani state is perceived to be absent in the delivery of 
public services, and thus viewed as ‘failed’ due to it not delivering national development. 
But Anwar shows that while development projects are often no longer state-led efforts, as 
they were under Ayub Khan’s rule, in many cases such projects are the result of state 
collaborations with private entrepreneurs. For instance, Anwar discusses how the 
establishment of an international airport in the Punjabi district of Sialkot was made 
possible through the collaboration of local private firms with the federal government. 
Anwar describes the eagerness of private entrepreneurs to contribute to national 
development as ‘entrepreneurial subjectivity,’ through which entrepreneurialism 
reconfigures the state. Interestingly, Anwar tracks how entrepreneurial subjectivity was 
constructed early on in Pakistan’s history through the state’s provision of roads and 
electricity to various parts of Pakistan, vital resources for entrepreneurial activities. As 
Anwar argues, though such entrepreneurial efforts extend beyond the state apparatus, 
they contribute to national development and thus state power. 
 In my view, there is much to be gained by putting Hibou into conversation with 
Anwar in the context of this case study. On the one hand, Hibou shows how the 
intensified financialization and internationalization of national territories in the 
contemporary era of globalization has lead to private actors increasingly taking on the 
role of the state; on the other hand, Anwar demonstrates how the state produces economic 
  13 
circuits that allow for such entrepreneurial efforts to happen. While Hibou sees the state 
as merely adapting to the global economy, and Anwar sees state power as reconfigured 
through state-firm collaborations, by synthesizing their approaches, what I wish to show 
is how the state acts upon economic space in order to enable private entrepreneurial 
efforts that reconfigure state power. That is to say, in my case study, I see state action as 
more than simply adaption to the global economy, and I see development as occurring 
beyond only state-firm collaborations.  
As I discuss in greater detail in Chapter II, housing schemes have been viewed as 
integral to national development since Pakistan’s First Five-Year Plan (1955-1960).35 
The development of Gulshan-e-Madina, as I explain in Chapter III, was made possible by 
the state’s integration of Bhakkar into the global economy through the provision of paved 
roads, the Internet, passports, visas, and remittance channels. It was access to these global 
economic circuits that allowed for Hafiz and his four partners to develop the housing 
scheme. Though it is a private entrepreneurial effort, Gulshan-e-Madina reconfigures the 
state in Bhakkar, and its development was made possible by the state acting upon a global 
economic space.  
Importantly, my view of the state’s role in my case study follows from Nikolas 
Rose’s understanding of the place of national governments in ‘advanced liberal’ 
societies.36 In such societies, Rose is interested how autonomous individuals are 
governed through their freedom. Key to this, Rose argues, is the transition from the 
welfare state to the ‘enabling state,’ or from the state that answers to society’s every need 
                                                
35 National Planning Board, The First Five-Year Plan, 1955-1960 (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 
1958). 
 
36 Nikolas Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999). 
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to the state that maintains conditions within which individuals provide for themselves. 
One of the many examples that Rose provides of the enabling state is of national 
governments acting upon an increasingly spatialized economy in order to assure 
individual access to global economic circuits. For Rose, this changing role of the state 
does not reflect its ‘weakness,’ but rather a more efficient form of its rule. While there is 
much to be said about the differences between postcolonial states such as Pakistan and 
the Western states that Rose confines his analysis to, the concept of the enabling state 
helps illuminate the nature of state power in contemporary Pakistan. In my case study, I 
explore how state’s integration of Bhakkar into the global economy enables development 
in the district. 
 In this thesis, it is not my intention to argue that the Pakistani state is a ‘strong’ 
rather than a ‘weak’ one. Following from Migdal and Schlichte, I am wary of the 
normative and hierarchical framework that these terms derive from, and I am especially 
resistant to how that hierarchy maps onto a West/non-West divide. Rather, I hope to 
better understanding the operation of state power in Pakistan: by considering practices 
conventionally viewed as exogenous to the state, I am interested in studying how state 
power in Pakistan ‘really works.’ 
 
Summary of Chapters 
 In Chapter II, I discuss how entrepreneurialism brings together a heterogeneous 
group of actors in the construction of housing schemes in Pakistan. While this is a 
dispersed and sometimes even contentious process, I argue that it also characterizes 
development in the country. In Chapter III, I turn to my case study to explore the 
relationship between entrepreneurialism and housing schemes in the rural, ‘backward’ 
  15 
district of Bhakkar. Tracking the partners’ use of various physical and digital networks, I 
show how the state’s provision of this infrastructure enabled development in the district. 
But while Chapters II and III discuss the myriad ways that state power is reconfigured in 
Pakistan, Chapter IV focuses on how it is resisted. The emergence of Gulshan-e-Madina 
inspired a housing transformation in the city, consisting of not just the development of 
additional housing schemes, but also the building of modern houses in the traditional 
urban fabric. Returning to governmentality, I employ Foucault’s concept of counter-
conduct to describe how such actions constitute a resistance state power insofar as they 
call development discourse’s natural appearance into question. The thesis concludes with 
a call for a genealogy of housing schemes in Pakistan to address questions that are critical 
but unfortunately beyond the scope of this project to engage.  
 
Methodology 
In the summer of 2013, I made the first of three trips to Pakistan for this project. 
Born to a Pakistan father and a white mother and raised in the US, I had first visited the 
country exactly 22 years earlier, when my father introduced me to my extended Pakistani 
family for the first time. My father and I spent most of those months at the family home 
in Kohat, a district belonging to the then-named North-West Frontier Province (now 
named Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). With an interest in agriculture and development, I wanted 
to return to rural Pakistan to conduct research for my MA thesis, but most of my family 
had shifted to Pakistan’s bigger cities in the intervening years. Luckily, my academic 
advisor had an acquaintance who was working for a private primary school in Bhakkar – 
Thinker’s Alliance, located in Gulshan-e-Madina. A deal was arranged for me teach 
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English at the school in exchange for accommodation with Hafiz, who lived in Darya 
Khan and owned several agricultural plots there. My goal was to learn more about 
Pakistan’s agricultural sector during this pilot phase of my research project and return to 
the country in winter to conduct my fieldwork.   
 Every weekday morning, I made the roughly half-hour commute to Thinker’s 
Alliance, often teaching outside, as the non-air-conditioned classrooms would broil in the 
summer heat. Following this, I usually accompanied one or more of the male family 
members – Hafiz and his two brothers, nephew, and son – on their daily routine, which 
included trips to their farmland, but also visits to factories, hospitals, markets, 
barbershops, and even sitting in on Hafiz’s work as a local politician. These experiences 
provided a glimpse of the day-to-day functioning of Bhakkar, and what consistently 
intrigued me was the district’s deep entanglement with the global economy. My interest 
in agriculture was gradually replaced by one in how development in this so-called 
‘backward’ area was enabled not so much by top-down or bottom-up efforts, but intense 
flows of people, capital, ideas, etc., and this was epitomized by Gulshan-e-Madina.  
Most of my family was now living in housing schemes in Islamabad and Lahore, 
and now I, despite my insistence on being in rural Pakistan, was working in one. I was 
curious about these points and how they might connect: Why were there so many housing 
schemes in bigger cities? What was the significance of one emerging in Bhakkar? How 
did this relate to the rarely acknowledged, yet glaring interconnectivity of the district? 
 I returned to Bhakkar in early 2014, when I conducted the bulk of the fieldwork 
for this project. I resumed my job as an English teacher, but this time I lived in a 
guestroom of one of the housing scheme’s residents. Residing in Gulshan-e-Madina 
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allowed me to contrast life in the housing scheme with that beyond its walls. It also put 
me in close proximity to its residents, who I hoped to interview, and even more 
importantly Youssef, the only one of Gulshan-e-Madina’s developers who lived in the 
housing scheme, and without whom access to the residents and other developers would 
not have been possible.  
 Youssef’s parents had migrated from India after Partition and were among those 
resettled in the area that eventually became known as Bhakkar. Youssef was the third 
eldest of 10 children who were supported by their father’s earnings as a commission 
agent for a fruit and vegetable market. When Youssef was only 21 years old, his father 
passed away, and he became responsible for his mother, youngest sister and five younger 
brothers, his other sister and two older brothers having married by that point. Youssef 
took over his father’s job as a commission agent while completing his master’s degree at 
a local government college, going to the market in the early morning before heading to 
class. The idea to build a housing scheme in Bhakkar started with Youssef, and 
fortunately for me, he was willing to share his story.  
 In addition to agreeing to being interviewed, Youssef arranged interviews for me 
with his four partners as well as residents and employees of the housing scheme. On an 
average day, I contacted Youssef in the morning, and Youssef arranged an interview by 
the afternoon, which would take place in the evening – though on some days multiple 
interviews were scheduled and on other days no interviews took place at all. I spent the 
intervening time preparing for interviews, working in the school, with existing contacts, 
and photographing the housing scheme and its surrounding area. Youssef also introduced 
me to Labib, a local architect who built approximately half of the houses in the housing 
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scheme as well as numerous houses elsewhere in the city. Labib had extensive historical 
and current knowledge of the city’s housing sector, and my relationship with him was 
crucial for situating my project within that context. Through these initial contacts, my 
network expanded to include others in Bhakkar, and I found myself spending nearly as 
much time in the city, towns, and villages beyond Gulshan-e-Madina’s walls as I did 
within them.   
 My third and final trip to conduct fieldwork for this project was a brief but 
important one. Between the first two trips, I had amassed an abundance of data on the 
housing scheme in Bhakkar, but I wanted to learn more about development in the bigger 
cities. During my second trip, while visiting family in Islamabad, I had met an architect 
named Ibrahim who owned a prominent firm in the city. I called Ibrahim from the US to 
inquire about the possibility of spending some time in his office: “Anytime, we’ll give 
you your own desk,” he enthusiastically responded.  
 My time in Ibrahim’s office was fruitful, though in unexpected ways. With access 
to one of the main arteries of Islamabad’s construction sector, the architecture profession, 
I had hoped to arrange interviews with some of the major players in the city’s real estate 
market. But while I was able to accumulate a vast array of sources related to these 
figures, such as newspaper and magazine articles about them, and websites, ads, and 
pamphlets about their properties, I made little headway with meeting them. However, my 
familiarity with these sources provided much needed context for the other experiences I 
had over the course of my time in Ibrahim’s office.  
Ibrahim was engaged in a number of projects during my trip, which lead to him 
dashing in and out of the office throughout the day for meetings with clients and 
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government officials, site inspections, groundbreaking ceremonies, etc. If I was able to 
catch him on his way out, he always allowed me to accompany him, which ended up 
providing ethnographic detail that became central to my project. Further, Ibrahim 
regularly made himself available to respond to questions that emerged for me during my 
time in the office, and the relationships I established with his employees over lunch 
breaks and after-hours coffee gave me yet more insight into Islamabad’s real estate sector 
through learning about the lives of those that sustained it.  
 I spent a total of 15 weeks in Pakistan conducting fieldwork for this project. As 
indicated above, participant observation and primary sources were key sources of data 
collection during this time. However, it should also be clear that without formal 
interviews the project would not have been possible. Often, this method was my only 
access the developers and residents of Gulshan-e-Madina as well as people in the district 
beyond.  
All of my interviews were semi-structured. I prepared a list of questions in 
advance according to both who I was interviewing and when in the research process the 
interview occurred – that is to say, I had rolling lists of questions for different types of 
contacts, as some questions were more relevant to some types of contacts than others, and 
over the course of my fieldwork, new questions emerged while old ones became 
unnecessary. I asked these questions in an order that seemed to flow with the 
conversation and added and discarded questions as the interview proceeded. I formally 
interviewed 29 contacts for this project. Some of these contacts were interviewed 
multiple times, but most of them only once. The interviews included Gulshan-e-Madina’s 
five developers as well as nine residents of the housing scheme. They also included 11 
  20 
contacts that lived outside of Gulshan-e-Madina, mainly in mohallas, but also villages 
and other housing schemes. As I was interested in the city’s housing transformation, most 
of my interviews in Bhakkar took place in the homes of my contacts, but some were held 
in the house I lived in. Finally, between Bhakkar, Islamabad, and Lahore, I conducted 
formal interviews with four contacts working in the real estate sector – two architects, 
one developer, and one property broker – all of which took place in their offices.  
Many of my contacts spoke intermediate to fluent English, which was helpful to 
me, as my Urdu is a work in progress, and I have little experience with Saraiki (a dialect 
of Punjabi and the first language of most people in Bhakkar). However, in the frequent 
instances when this was not the case, a translator facilitated my interviews. All of my 
interviews were recorded and later transcribed. I transcribed the English interviews, and a 
research assistant translated and transcribed the Urdu and Saraiki interviews. Lastly, I 
have decided to use pseudonyms for all contacts named in this thesis in order to mitigate 
any unforeseeable, but nevertheless potential consequences of its contents.  
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CHAPTER II 
ENTREPRENEURIALISM, HOUSING, AND DEVELOPMENT IN 
PAKISTAN 
 In February of 2014, I attended a real estate conference in Islamabad organized by 
Pakistani newspaper DAWN. The conference sought to bring together industry experts to 
discuss the challenges and investment opportunities in Pakistan’s real estate sector. It was 
divided into three sessions, the first consisting of a series individual presentations and the 
second and third of panel discussions. While the second and third sessions included lively 
debates about timely topics such as low-income housing, the first session centered around 
a presentation by a representative of the Gulberg Islamabad housing scheme, which was 
the main sponsor of the event. 
 Gulberg is a master-planned, 20,000 kanal housing scheme (Fig. 1).1 It is a joint 
venture between the Intelligence Bureau Employee Cooperative Housing Society 
(IBECHS) and a private developer. The IBECHS is the welfare foundation attached to 
Pakistan’s Intelligence Bureau (IB), and it is tasked with benefitting the employees of 
that government organization. Such projects begin by forming a cooperative society, 
acquiring land from the state, designing a map, and selling a limited number of plots to 
the organization’s employees at subsidized rates. This initial capital provides funds for 
the scheme’s further development, after which a larger number of plots are made 
available to the public, albeit at less favorable prices. At this point, plot holding 
employees either construct a home on their plot, or as is much more frequently the case, 
sell their plot, now much more valuable due to the housing scheme’s development and 
                                                
1 A kanal is a unit of land measurement commonly used to describe property in Pakistan. One kanal equals 
one-eighth of an acre. 
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current plot prices. Ideally, joint ventures such as Gulberg benefit both parties; the 
organization’s members receive early access to a lucrative investment, and the developers 
receive early investors for their project, as well as the ability to associate that project with 
a reputable name.  
 
 
Figure 1: Gulberg Islamabad master plan (http://www.gulbergislamabad.com) 
  
The Gulberg representative’s presentation began with a five-minute promotional 
video for the housing scheme, consisting of an animated tour of the yet to be constructed 
site. The video introduced Gulberg as Pakistan’s “largest modern infrastructure” and 
went on to highlight a range of its amenities, including a commercial district, universities, 
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colleges, primary schools, and public libraries, independent power and water sources, a 
police force, and hospitals, pharmacies, and fire stations.  
Using a series of colorful and detailed slides, the presenter then transitioned to 
explaining Islamabad’s master plan and how it has been compromised by the city’s 
rapidly growing population. According to him, Islamabad’s uncontrolled expansion has 
lead to haphazard growth, which has resulted in inadequate service provision, 
environmental degradation, and increased crime and rents. Next, the presenter proposed 
his solution to the problem. Pointing to Gulberg as an example, he argued that meeting 
Islamabad’s development needs requires greater collaboration between the state and the 
private sector and the overall fostering of an entrepreneurial culture.  
This brief vignette introduces three points that I hope to make clear in this 
chapter: 1) the union between housing schemes and development in Pakistan; 2) the role 
of entrepreneurialism in these projects; and, 3) the range of actors involved in developing 
housing schemes, and thus contributing to national development. The chapter begins by 
tracing the relationship between housing schemes and development in Pakistan to the 
country’s First Five-Year Plan, which conceived of housing schemes as integral to 
achieving national development goals. In the following section, I describe array of actors 
involved in developing housing schemes in Pakistan. While this process is a dispersed 
and heterogeneous one, I argue that it is also the way that development ‘really works’ in 
the country. The chapter ends with a story from my fieldwork in Ibrahim’s office that 
demonstrates how corruption, often associated with state inefficiency, is constitutive of 
state power in Pakistan.  
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Housing Schemes and Development 
The association of projects such as Gulberg with development is enshrined in 
Pakistan’s first comprehensive, nationwide development initiative, the country’s First 
Five-Year Plan. The plan refers to the housing sector as “housing and settlements,” which 
it defines as “the sum-total of physical facilities essential to the development of a 
harmonious, healthy and happy community life.”2 Thus, in the plan, housing designates a 
long list of social services, including public buildings, factories, markets, mosques, 
schools, hospitals, sewerage, water and electricity supply, and road and communication 
systems. Further, the plan emphasizes the importance of these services being well-
planned: “New suburban building is often characterised by bad design and construction, 
excessive use of expensive building materials, and extravagant planning for the use of 
land. Towns are growing without adequate town plans and reflect the same array of 
problems; an increase of population and insufficient resources with which to create 
satisfactory human settlements.”3 Finally, the plan suggests that these all-inclusive, 
master planned housing schemes are not only part of, but central to development, stating 
that they are “perhaps the first type of investment carried out in any society, and in a 
developing economy the amount of public and private investment in housing and 
settlements frequently is larger than in any other field.”4 Pakistan’s First Five-Year Plan, 
then, establishes a very specific definition of housing (an array of social services 
organized by a master plan) and accords it an integral role in development.  
                                                
2 National Planning Board, The First Five-Year Plan, 1955-1960 (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 1958): 
517. 
 
3 Ibid., 518. 
 
4 Ibid., 517 
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But despite the importance attributed to housing schemes, the state has allocated 
few funds for such projects. Rather, housing schemes are typically entrepreneurial 
ventures, relying on profit for their development. This has meant that not only are 
development authorities – the organizations officially tasked with constructing housing 
schemes – required to earn a profit, but also that a variety of other actors seeking 
financial gain have become involved in the development of housing schemes. The lack of 
centralization as well as blurring of public and private roles that characterizes the housing 
sector in Pakistan is often associated with a ‘weak’ or ‘failed’ state. As a study of housing 
in Karachi potently put it: 
The problem is not the laws, but governance. It is difficult to implement and 
enforce laws when the city and province are locked in conflict; when bureaucrats 
and government ministers use their discretionary powers for patronage rather than 
to serve the objectives of these laws; when powerful mafias invest their money in 
the lucrative formal and informal real estate sector and openly flout plans and 
laws with the help of a willing establishment and when the armed forces and other 
federal landowning agencies constantly interfere in land related matters.5  
 
However, by considering state power beyond the normative conception of the 
state that such perspectives rely upon, a heterogeneous view of statehood in Pakistan 
emerges. Though housing schemes are developed in a disparate and entrepreneurial 
manner, these projects also contribute to a vision of national development set forth in 
Pakistan’s First Five-Year Plan. While development in Pakistan may be an unstable and 
even chaotic process, I argue that this is also how it ‘really works.’ 
 
Cooperative Housing Societies 
Cooperative housing societies trace back to the Societies Registration Act of 
1860, which established a definition of a ‘society’ as a non-commercial institution that 
                                                
5 Arif Hasan et al., Karachi: The Land Issue (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
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promoted activities such as science, literature, fine arts, education, or charity.6 However, 
the commercial aspect of cooperatives began to change with the Co-operative Credit 
Societies Act of 1904.7  This act was intended to allow small-farming societies to develop 
financing mechanisms that would facilitate their transition from subsistence farming to 
the British Raj’s agricultural market, an expanding economy that the Empire increasingly 
profited from.8 The role of profit in cooperative societies was vastly expanded in an 
amendment to the 1904 act in 1912, which defined cooperatives as “a society which has 
as its object the promotion of the economic interests of its members in accordance with 
co-operative principles.”9 Thus, under the 1912 amendment, cooperatives were not only 
profit oriented, but provided opportunities for a range of entrepreneurial activities.  
Housing schemes explicitly became one of these activities in the Co-operative 
Societies Act of 1925, which delineated five types of cooperative societies. The act 
defined cooperative housing societies as “a society formed with the object of providing 
its members with dwelling houses on conditions to be determined by its by-laws.”10 
Further, like contemporary housing schemes, cooperative housing societies were required 
to be organized by a master plan and provide an array of public amenities. Thus, by 1925, 
cooperatives provided key legislative framework for both the development of housing 
schemes and profit.  
                                                
6 Societies Registration Act, 1860 (Government of India, 1860). 
 
7 Co-Operative Credit Societies Act, 1904 (Government of India, 1904). 
 
8 Shabnum Tejani, “The Colonial Legacy,” in Pathways to Power: The Domestic Politics of South Asia, ed. 
Arjun Guneratne and Anita M. Weiss (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014). 
 
9 The Co-Operative Societies Act, 1912 (Government of India, 1912): 2. 
 
10 Co-Operative Societies Act, 1925 (Government of India, 1925): 5. 
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The Pakistani military is the country’s largest cooperative housing society 
developer. The military’s cooperative housing societies are developed through its welfare 
foundations, such as the Army Welfare Trust (AWT) and Bahria Foundation (BF). Today 
in Pakistan, AWT’s Askari Housing Societies and BF’s Bahria Housing Schemes have 
multiple locations throughout Pakistan’s major cities. Additionally, the military 
administers Defense Housing Authority (DHA), which develops cooperative housing 
societies but is also a development authority with extensive rights. The military’s 
cooperative housing societies initially only provided plots to its members, but today, like 
Gulberg, they do this alongside making plots available to the general public at higher 
rates.  
As Ayesha Siddiqa has shown, the the military has used its political power to 
make its real estate ventures successful.11 This has included the acquisition of land 
through the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, a law enacted during the colonial era that 
permits state institutions to acquire land for “public purpose.”12 Siddiqa argues that the 
law’s lack of definition of ‘public purpose’ essentially allows the military to acquire land 
strictly for its financial gain, often displacing settled populations in the process. This 
political power also includes the military’s embedment in the political system through the 
appointment of retired officers to various governmental posts as well as the National 
Security Council, an organization consisting of military cadre that is required to be 
consulted on matters of national security. Siddiqa suggests that the military’s 
involvement in politics grants it access to privileged information about city planning that 
                                                
11 Ayesha Siddiqa, Military, Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 
2007). 
 
12 The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Government of India, 1894): 1. 
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makes its housing scheme developments more profitable. She argues that the dependence 
of the military’s financial operations upon its political power leads to the institution 
striving to maintain a permanent presence in Pakistan’s political processes.  
But Siddiqa’s argument, building on Jalal, that the military’s influence over the 
state apparatus impedes development requires reconsideration here. First, as Siddiqa 
herself notes, the military uses its housing schemes to demonstrate its position as the 
leader of development in the country. While it cannot be disputed that these projects are 
an instrument of financial gain for the military, it is also clear that they contribute to 
national development. In other words, entrepreneurialism and development are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. Second, Siddiqa’s focus on the military obscures the 
range of other actors that both benefit financially and contribute to national development 
by constructing cooperative housing societies. Co-operative Housing International has 
noted the existence of 2,687 cooperative housing societies in Pakistan.13 In addition to 
those built by the military, these include housing schemes developed by numerous 
bureaucratic organizations (such as Gulberg), the judiciary, and myriad religious, ethnic, 
and trade groups. What emerges here is an understanding of development in Pakistan not 
as compromised by the interests of the military, but participated in by an array of 
organizations whose self-help efforts align with the needs of the state.  
 
Development Authorities 
 As mentioned above, while it was accorded an integral role in Pakistan’s First 
Five-Year Plan, the construction of housing schemes was allocated few funds by the 
state. Instead, local development authorities were established to develop these projects 
                                                
13 Co-operative Housing International, “Pakistan,” http://www.icahousing.coop/co-ops/pakistan. 
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through the sale of plots. Under this model, in addition to drafting master plans, 
regulating new construction, and managing existing infrastructure, development 
authorities designed, developed, and marketed housing schemes constructed on state-
owned land.14 And as with cooperative societies, development authorities allocated a 
limited number of plots for their members, providing significant financial benefit to the 
organization itself.  
 The role of development authorities in urban planning varies from city to city. In 
Islamabad, the Capital Development Authority (CDA) has executive authority over 
planning and development in the city. The only exception to this is DHA schemes, which 
were first established in the city in 2005. By contrast, while the Karachi Municipal 
Corporation (KMC) was a major provider of housing until the 1980s, it is now little more 
than a regulator of competing developers.15 The Lahore Development Authority (LDA) 
sits somewhere between these examples. Though LDA acts as a regulatory body for 
numerous competing developers, it also remains actively involved in constructing new 
housing schemes in the city.  
One of LDA’s most recent projects is LDA City, a 60,000 kanal scheme with 
amenities comparable to Gulberg (Fig. 2). Contesting the military’s claim to be the leader 
of national development, LDA views and markets itself as the only institution capable of 
meeting development needs, at least as far as Lahore is concerned. While acknowledging 
the contributions of other developers, promotional materials for LDA City cite Lahore’s 
                                                
14 David E. Dowall, “Comparing Karachi’s Informal and Formal Housing Delivery Systems,” Cities 8, no. 
3 (1991). 
 
15 Hasan et al., Karachi: The Land Issue. 
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Figure 2: LDA City newspaper advertisement (http://www.lda.city) 
  31 
growing population and the need for “mega” projects that only the government 
organization is capable of providing.16 But while competition exists between these state 
institutions over which should lead development, this lack of centralization should not be 
associated with state ‘failure’ or ‘weakness.’ Rather, the disparate manner through which 
housing schemes are developed in Lahore is suggestive of how a range of actors 
contribute to development in the city.  
LDA City has also relied on the private sector for its completion. The project has 
recently utilized a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) model, within which housing became 
legally viable in The Punjab Public Private Partnership Act 2014.17 Facing protests by 
residents and owners of the land to be acquired for LDA City, LDA hired four private 
development firms to facilitate the acquisition process. That LDA relied on private firms, 
rather than the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, to acquire the land required for its project 
does not indicate state ‘weakness’; rather, it demonstrates how fluidity between public 
and private roles is not an exception, but a condition of development in Pakistan.   
 
The Private Sector 
  Private housing schemes are those constructed on privately owned land. Thus, 
unlike housing schemes developed by cooperative societies and development authorities,  
they do not require land owned, allocated, or acquired by the state. Legally, however, 
private housing schemes still must abide by the state’s established regulations.  
Malik Riaz is Pakistan’s most well-known private developer, not to mention one 
of the country’s wealthiest residents. Riaz’s Bahria Town housing schemes are located in 
                                                
16 LDA City, “LDA City Lahore - Pakistan’s Largest Housing Society,” http://lda.city/. 
 
17 The Punjab Public Private Partnership Act 2014 (Government of the Punjab, 2014). 
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Islamabad, Lahore, and Karachi. Riaz is also behind a number of other development 
projects throughout these cities, including skyscrapers, expressways, and mixed-use 
developments. And like the military and LDA, Riaz views himself as the leader of 
national development. Riaz regularly scorns the state in the media, even going as far as 
lamenting his own infrastructure projects, which he says the state should be providing.18 
Affirming his central role in national development, he stated at a recent press conference, 
“We know that the construction sector has played a key role in transforming the USA, 
Malaysia, Japan, Turkey and Germany into developed nations. In the same manner, 
Insha’Allah, Pakistan will also become a developed nation, which is our [Bahria Town’s] 
vision.”19 
  But Riaz’s valorization of the private sector is misleading. His housing schemes 
have a familiar name (Bahria) because in the 1990s he formed a partnership with BF, 
under which Bahria Town originated. Under the partnership, Riaz benefited from 
credibility of the navy’s name and logo for his housing schemes, and the navy benefited 
from financial stakes and plots in the developments. The partnership ended in 2000 when 
BF accused Riaz of fraud, but Riaz continued to use their name and logo, which has 
prompted an ongoing litigation battle. Despite his conflict with the navy, Riaz signed an 
Memorandum of Understanding with DHA in 2006, which allowed for the integration of 
infrastructure and cooperation on development work between the two parties.20 However, 
critics have alleged that the real substance of the partnership is land grabbing, now 
                                                
18 Hanif Khalid, “Millions to Benefit from Bahria Town Projects: Malik Riaz,” The News, March 13, 2014. 
 
19 “Pakistan’s 1st Island City: Bahria Town Signs $20b Deal with US Tycoon,” The Express Tribune, 
March 12, 2013. 
 
20 Siddiqa, Military, Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy. 
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facilitated by combining the tactics of a private developer with the political power of the 
army.21  
Indeed, the expansion of the Riaz and DHA empires as well as the accompanying 
scandals have intensified in the subsequent years. But what I would like to emphasize 
here is how development in Pakistan appears to prescribe, rather than prohibit, shifting 
alliances between numerous actors, all of whom nevertheless contribute to state power. 
 
The Informal Sector  
 The housing schemes discussed up to this point account for less than a third of the 
country’s housing needs;22 this gap is filled by informal housing, which, as Janet Roitman 
explains,23 suggests a sector that is beyond or even against the state. Private housing 
developers have increasingly turned to the informal sector for a number of reasons: the 
formal sector’s stringent regulations (including a minimum size of 160 kanals and 
allocation of 50 percent of the gross land area for public purposes), red tape (obtaining 
building approval requires interfacing with 15-25 authorities), and cost (of construction in 
relation to the first point, and bribes in relation to the second point).24 But as Roitman’s 
work on informal economies in the Chad Basin uncovers, the informal sector is often not 
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only linked to, but constitutive of state power. Indeed, informal housing in Pakistan, 
whether katchi abadis (unauthorized settlements on state land) or illegal housing schemes 
(unauthorized subdivisions of private land), is not exempt from the regulations governing 
the formal sector, and therefore it is part and parcel of development.  
 Katchi abadis in Pakistan are as old as the country itself. The creation of Pakistan 
was accompanied by millions of Muslims migrating from India to the new Muslim 
homeland, along with similar numbers of Hindus and Sikhs traveling in the opposite 
direction. By 1951, approximately 10 percent of Pakistan’s population consisted of 
migrants from India. Although many well-to-do migrants were settled in abandoned 
properties, the working class largely clustered in katchi abadis in Pakistan’s larger 
cities.25 The concentration of industrialization in urban areas over following decades 
increased internal migration to these localities, further adding to the number of katchi 
abadis in these cities. The state’s response to the rising number of katchi abadis was to 
begin demolishing these settlements, which lead to activism on their behalf and 
eventually opportunities for these sites to become legalized. Crucially, in order to 
improve their chance for regularization, katchi abadis emulate formal housing scheme 
regulations. For example, in his study of a katchi abadi in Karachi, Arif Hasan noted that 
it was organized by a gridiron plan and featured levelled roads, a mosque, a market, a 
school, and a commercial area.26  
 While regularization has been celebrated as enhancing the rights of people living 
in katchi abadis, it has also made katchi abadis potentially lucrative real estate 
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investments. Still an informal process, the development of katchi abadis no longer occurs 
through unorganized invasions of state land, but the occupation of this land by private 
developers with the support of state officials.27 With the opportunity for regularization, 
private developers are keen to develop katchi abadis, as they can earn greater profits 
from renting or selling plots at a site that is not at risk of being demolished. The 
complicity of state officials is critical for these projects, as they can ensure that the site is 
not demolished prior to regularization and provide the (illegal) delivery of public 
services, such as water and electricity. These officials benefit not only from being 
allocated plots in the site, but also voting blocks formed by the site’s residents. 
While not constructed on occupied state land, illegal housing schemes similarly 
do not abide by formal regulations and are considered a part of the informal sector. Like 
katchi abadis, their developers follow formal planning approaches, but in this case 
primarily to increase the appeal of their plots, as no regularization process exists for 
illegal housing schemes. Nevertheless, this results in similar relationships with numerous 
state officials, who ensure the development of the scheme in exchange for financial 
benefits. Though development authorities regularly publish lists of illegal housing 
schemes through their websites and newspapers to ward off potential customers, officials 
within these organizations often have relationships with the developers of these schemes, 
in some cases drafting the master plans of the sites.28 In a 2015 newspaper article 
announcing the existence of 105 illegal housing schemes in Islamabad, a CDA official 
admitted that many of these sites had been developed with the complicity of the 
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organization’s management, and that some of their inaugural ceremonies had been 
attended by federal ministers.29  
 Katchi abadis and illegal housing schemes, while considered part of the informal 
housing sector, create alliances between private developers and state officials that are 
essential to development. The desire for regularization and profit conforms these sites to 
state regulations, incorporating them into the path to national development.  
 
A Bribe and the State 
While examples of corruption such as those practiced in the informal sector 
described above are commonly associated with a dysfunctional state, they do not 
necessarily imply a state lacking capacity. In this section, I use a short story from my 
fieldwork in Islamabad to show how a bribe can signal less the deficiency of the state 
than a key strategy of its rule.  
The relationship between state power and corruption was made obvious to me 
during my time in Ibrahim’s architecture firm. The first time I met Ibrahim, he had just 
landed a deal with a prominent private school network, and by the time I returned the 
following year, he was working on several renovation projects for the organization. The 
partnership seemed to have subsumed Ibrahim in a perpetual state of haggling, which 
took place over endless phone calls and meetings. Though I was struck by how much 
pressure Ibrahim seemed to be under as compared with just a year before, I was equally 
impressed by his ability to navigate these constantly emerging tensions. Ibrahim’s work 
day was also not unique, as was made clear to me by the numerous people I spoke with 
that worked in the real estate sector in the city. These architects, engineers, and 
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developers often grumbled to me about the impossibility of balancing the desires of their 
clients with those of state officials, which they nevertheless managed to do.  
One particularly contentious day illustrates how these conflicts, characteristic of 
development in Pakistan more broadly, are constitutive of state power. I had 
accompanied Ibrahim and Akbar, one of the firm’s architects, to a meeting with the CDA 
to approve one of the firm’s projects for the aforementioned client. This approval comes 
in the form of a No Objection Certificate (NOC), which is issued by the state for various 
types of activities in the country, in this case construction. Ibrahim looked over the CDA 
official’s shoulder at the project’s master plan, which was laid out on the official’s desk, 
and nodded in acknowledgement as he was told everything that would need to be 
changed before receiving an NOC. Though Ibrahim and Akbar remained polite through 
the end of the meeting, their frustration was obvious, and expressed explicitly as soon as 
we left the office.  
Ibrahim explained that he had gone back and forth with the CDA over this 
particular project for months, and now the official had shown him a discrepancy in the 
size of the land between his master plan and the CDA’s records. Ibrahim would have to 
go through the process all over again, including drawing up the plan and inviting public 
objections, which entails placing an ad in local newspapers about the project to ensure 
that no one opposes its construction (a province-wide requirement for private 
developers). It would take at least a month, and “on the other hand the client wants it 
done overnight,” Ibrahim lamented. Having learned enough about the real estate business 
in Pakistan by this point to know of a faster way to solve the problem, I asked Ibrahim 
why he didn’t just bribe the official. Ibrahim explained that in this instance, such a bribe 
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would need to be distributed amongst the 36 or so signatories to the NOC and cost 
upward of one million Pakistani Rupees (PKR).30 Though he and his client were well 
aware of this short cut, his client did not want to pay. 
The next stop was to deliver the news to the client, whose office was located in 
another school that Ibrahim was renovating. As Ibrahim predicted, Amir was furious, first 
berating Ibrahim and then the CDA official. “I should put a hit out on this guy!” Amir 
said in exasperation, before a grin crept a cross his face and he chuckled, letting Ibrahim 
know that he was ready to hear his thoughts on the best way to move forward. While 
Ibrahim and Amir continued talking, Akbar and I visited the construction site so that he 
could check on its progress. I continued my line of questioning about bribes: Would the 
CDA approve anything so long as they are bribed? No, Akbar responded. He explained 
that when bribes are paid to the CDA, the master plan still has to conform to their 
guidelines. Yet, because CDA officials rarely followed up on construction projects, 
changes were sometimes made after that point. But if the CDA caught the firm making 
such changes, the firm would fix them and then pay another bribe in order to avoid more 
official sanctions. 
This story provides a glimpse into the contentious process of development in 
Pakistan as well as how such conflicts are folded into state power. By delaying the 
progress of Amir’s project, the CDA was attempting to force a bribe. And yet, the bribe 
would buy nothing more than the smooth function of bureaucracy – that is to say, Amir’s 
project was still forced to conform to the state’s spatial order. This strategy is further 
extended by the state’s irregular presence after the project’s completion, which increases 
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the likelihood of both Amir violating the state’s regulations and the state sanctioning him 
for doing so. Though Amir refused to pay, many do, specifically over half of all private 
developers in the province.31 While such practices are often associated with a state’s 
inefficiency, I view them as a strategy that ensures the state’s viability. These payments, 
made informally and spread throughout state institutions, supplement the salaries of 
lower to higher level officials and are important contributions to the vitality of state 
institutions.32 While demonstrative of corruption at the upper echelons of the state, the 
story of Amir’s project also helps explain how such acts are a strategy of state power in 
Pakistan.  
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have discussed the decentralized, heterogeneous process 
underlying a central tenant of Pakistan’s path to national development: the construction 
of housing schemes. As a developmental state, Pakistani state action is defined by its 
mobilization of the nation toward modernity. However, in Pakistan, I have shown how 
this mobilization is not carried out by an all-powerful state apparatus; rather, 
development occurs through entrepreneurial efforts by a range of actors whose public and 
private roles are not well-defined. While departing from the coherence and boundedness 
that characterizes the Weberian ideal-type state, I argue that this description of statehood 
in Pakistan is “the way things really work.” By including the story of Amir’s project, I 
attempted to provide richer empirical detail on how the seeming chaos that defines 
development in Pakistan is in fact constitutive of state power.   
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 In the following chapter, I show how the state’s integration of Bhakkar into the 
global economy has enabled the development of a privately-developed housing scheme 
there. This effort was carried out by a group of entrepreneurs who perceived themselves 
to be providing services that the state was expected, but failed to deliver. But rather than 
demonstrating the ‘weakness’ of the Pakistani state, I argue that the development of the 
housing scheme shows how state power is reconfigured in the rural, ‘backward’ district. 
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CHAPTER III 
ENABLING DEVELOPMENT IN BHAKKAR 
 Following a long day at the office, Akbar and I sat outside a coffee shop in 
Islamabad’s relatively newly developed F-11 sector, along with Hayat, another architect 
from Ibrahim’s firm, and Bilal, the owner of an engineering firm who frequently 
collaborates on projects with Ibrahim. Though the conversation started off casually, it 
quickly turned to what brought us all together in the first place: their work. Bilal directed 
my attention to the recently constructed businesses and apartment towers that surrounded 
us. “It’s all black money,” he told me, the others nodding in agreement. While this wasn’t 
the only time I’d heard the phrase ‘black money’ come up during my fieldwork, it was 
my first opportunity to ask someone to explain it to me. According to Bilal, Islamabad’s 
construction boom was funded by Pathans (an ethnic group primarily located in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan) selling arms and narcotics and laundering the profits through 
urban property. “They make a building and charge rent and say this is where the funds 
came from,” he clarified for me.  
 The ethnic aspect of Bilal’s explanation reflects essentialist accounts of Pathans 
as ungovernable. Grounded in British rule, these were expressed in numerous ways 
throughout my fieldwork in Pakistan. That Akbar and Hayat are Pathans and did not raise 
objections to Bilal’s comments perhaps indicates the extent to which such views have 
become normalized in and through state, media, as well as scholarly discourses. But 
while representations of Pathans calls for further attention, that is beyond the scope of 
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this project.1 Unfortunately, the same goes for tracking the flow of guns, drugs, and 
money within and beyond Pakistan’s borders. In this chapter, I am interested in how the 
flows of the contemporary global economy contributed to the development of a housing 
scheme in Bhakkar, Pakistan. 
The chapter begins by sketching an overview of the relationship between 
Pakistan’s real estate sector and global economic circuits. While Bilal’s observation 
about ‘black money’ is illuminating, I add the role of foreign aid and remittances. Though 
investments from multinational firms generally facilitate real estate growth in emerging 
markets, Pakistan’s construction boom has largely been funded through these other 
channels. Turning to my case study, I explain how the development of a housing scheme 
in Bhakkar relied upon the state’s inclusion of the district into various networks of 
economic circulation. Essential to the development of Gulshan-e-Madina, I show, has 
been Bhakkar’s integration as a district as well as regionally, nationally, and 
internationally through paved roads, the Internet, passports, visas, and remittance 
channels, all of which have been made available by the state. My argument is that the 
Pakistani state’s power in this instance does not obtain from its felt presence in Bhakkar, 
but its assurance of access to global economic circuits through which private 
entrepreneurs contribute to national development.  
 
The Global Economy and Real Estate in Pakistan 
Real estate in emerging markets has been an increasingly lucrative investment for 
multinational firms. As rural to urban migration and industrialization in these countries 
                                                
1 For an important and engaging discussion of the ‘theoretical apartheid’ that Pathans have been subjected 
to in Pakistan, see Maira Hayat, “Still ‘Taming the Turbulent Frontier’? The State in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan,” JASO Online 1, no. 2 (2009). 
  43 
intensifies, so does the need for both residential and commercial construction. Real Estate 
2020: Building the Future,2 a 2014 report published by multinational consultancy firm 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, estimates that the global stock of real estate will increase by 55 
percent by 2020, with the greatest expansion occurring in emerging markets. One of the 
countries where multinational firms have taken advantage of this growth is Pakistan’s 
neighbor, India, where Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the construction sector was 
nearly 1.2 billion USD in 2013.3 
 But the large amount of FDI in India’s real estate has required the increased 
amenability of the country’s real estate sector to international investment.4 In 2004, when 
India’s real estate market was ranked by the Global Real Estate Transparency Index as 
having ‘low transparency,’5 FDI in real estate was only 121.5 million USD.6 Increased 
FDI in Indian real estate has corresponded to changes in accounting and reporting 
practices, stronger regulation of legal processes, and the establishment of Real Estate 
Investment Trusts, all of which lead to the sector’s ‘semi-transparent’ ranking today.7 
This alignment between real estate practices in India and international norms has been 
integral to boosting multinational investor confidence and therefore investment. 
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 By contrast, the 2014 Global Real Estate Transparency Index describes 
Pakistan’s real estate market as among the least transparent globally.8 The report ranks 
Pakistan’s real estate sector as ‘opaque,’ suggesting an absence of financial benchmarks, 
lack of comprehensive statistics, unpublished or selectively enforced tax procedures, 
corruption, missing land titles, and the relative likelihood of state appropriation of private 
property. The perception of Pakistan’s real estate market as a risky investment for 
multinational firms has largely deterred FDI in the sector. However, as indicated in the 
previous chapter, this has not prevented a robust real estate market in the country. Rather, 
it has meant that Pakistan’s growing real estate sector has been largely funded through 
other global economic circuits.  
 Pakistan’s geopolitical circumstances entered the country into an early and 
extensive relationship with the global financial flows. With British influence in the 
Middle East declining after World War II, the US sought to secure its interest in the oil-
rich region against the USSR, which it believed could not be accomplished without the 
help of Pakistan.9 Key to this was building up Pakistan’s defense forces, which 
established a financial connection between the US and the Pakistan Army. As Siddiqa has 
noted, a significant portion of these funds were misappropriated for the military’s private 
gain, including its real estate ventures. Also backed by US aid was the construction of 
Pakistan’s first master-planned city, Islamabad, under the military rule of Ayub Khan.  
 Though aid waxed and waned over the following decade along with US-Pakistan 
relations, this bond was renewed when the USSR invaded Afghanistan during the 
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military rule of Zia Ul-Haq. The Reagan administration provided two several billion-
dollar aid packages to Pakistan in return for their support in the effort against the Soviets, 
in addition to several billion more dollars to Afghan militants that was channeled through 
the Pakistan Army. The increased availability of external funds was used to further 
entrench the defense establishment in Pakistan’s political-economy, primarily through 
investments in real estate.10 Moreover, additional funds for the war effort were raised 
through trafficking heroin from Afghanistan through Pakistan, which went on to be sold 
both within and beyond the country’s borders. Reflecting Bilal’s observation about ‘black 
money,’ this created a large number of entrepreneurs who benefited from these domestic 
and international transactions and invested their profits in Pakistan’s real estate market.11 
 Pakistan’s next real estate boom followed the September 11th, 2001 attacks in the 
US and the subsequent flood of remittances. The increased monitoring of the wealth and 
assets of Pakistanis living in Western countries after 9/11, as well as precariousness of 
their residency status, encouraged them to invest larger portions of their savings in their 
home country, leading to the quadrupling of remittances over the following several 
years.12 Most of these funds entered the real estate market, as plots in housing schemes 
had historically provided lucrative returns, and interest bearing deposits are viewed by 
many Pakistanis as haram (unethical according to Islamic law).13 This resulted in the 
rapid expansion of housing schemes in Pakistan’s major cities as well as a rise in 
property prices in those schemes. Alongside this, curbs on informal financial transfers 
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following 9/11 channeled these remittances through Pakistan’s banking system, which 
increased the availability of credit.14 Greater access to loans allowed medium-sized 
entrepreneurs such as exporters, traders, manufacturing unit owners and agriculturalists to 
also invest in the country’s burgeoning real estate sector.15   
 As in many emerging markets, global financial flows have played a central role in 
Pakistan’s real estate sector. But rather than investments by multinational firms, real 
estate ventures in Pakistan have largely been local entrepreneurial efforts funded through 
other global economic circuits, such as foreign aid (and its misappropriation), ‘black 
money,’ and remittances. Below, I discuss how the state’s inclusion of Bhakkar into 
various networks of economic circulation facilitated the development of Gulshan-e-
Madina. First, however, it is necessary to situate Bhakkar in the context of this 
discussion. 
 
A ‘Backward’ Area 
 There is no greater instantiation of Pakistan’s First Five-Year Plan than the 
development of Islamabad under Ayub Khan. Following independence and partition from 
India in 1947, the new nation-state faced political fragmentation between numerous 
stakeholders. The country’s first decade was thus defined by political turbulence, 
culminating in a military intervention that brought Ayub Khan to power in 1958. As 
Annie Harper has argued,16 though the Islamabad project was clearly Ayub Khan’s 
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attempt to demonstrate his newly acquired authority, it was also his effort to create an 
‘ideal Pakistani space’ that overcame the inherited contradictions of the new country: 
“While Ayub Khan was certainly concerned about legitimizing and consolidating his own 
power, he was also an idealist, and a nationalist, deeply concerned to unite Pakistan, and 
to shape the nation, and its people, according to his ideal vision of the future. . . . 
Building a new capital city fit with this wider professed aim of building a stronger and 
more unified nation.”  
Islamabad’s master plan organized the city’s residential areas into sectors, with 
each sector allocating specific spaces not only for housing, but also a range of amenities, 
including schools, markets, mosques, hospitals, parks, post offices, fire departments, 
police stations, markets, etc (Fig. 3). As Ayub Khan intended, the new capital city’s 
modern planning principles differentiated it from the mohallas (neighborhoods) that 
largely comprised the built environments of most other Pakistani cities. Rather than a 
central plan, mohallas were organized by forms of sociality, such as family, religion, or 
ethnicity.17 For Ayub Khan, mohallas were associated with the tradition and hierarchy 
that were responsible for Pakistan’s political instability, and thus the nation’s ‘backward’ 
past. The new military ruler viewed Islamabad as an opportunity to build a stronger 
nation by demonstrating Pakistan’s potential to become modern, which would serve as 
exemplar to the rest of nation and legitimate the nation to the rest of the world.18  
If Islamabad is an ideal Pakistani space, then Bhakkar is the past it is striving to 
transcend. Though I made the five-hour drive between Islamabad and Bhakkar more  
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Figure 3: Islamabad’s master plan (Hull, Government of Paper: The Materiality of 
Bureaucracy in Urban Pakistan: 3.) 
 
 
times than I would have preferred during my fieldwork, these trips helped me understand 
how modern and ‘backward’ mapped onto space in Pakistan. From Islamabad, a short 
link road connects to Pakistan’s Motorway, the subcontinent’s first multiple lane, high-
speed, limited access ‘American-style highway.’19 Exiting the motorway after about 30 
minutes to head west toward Bhakkar, the path becomes a narrow, two-lane road for the 
remainder of the trip, and the barriers of the Motorway disappear, as does the lush green 
farmland that borders them. In place of the latter is a landscape that becomes increasingly 
dry: undeveloped land consisting of dirt, dried out bushes, bunches of tall, brown grass, 
and dead or dying trees. Interspersed with this are occasional rows of shops, mosques, 
schools, gas stations, brick kilns, patches of agriculture, small villages and towns, and the 
crowded bazaars (markets) of the cities of Talagang and Mianwali. Entering Bhakkar, 
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nomad colonies become more frequent, as do the wheat fields that the seasonal laborers 
mostly work on. Then the road hits the city, a dense mass of mohallas constructed 
outward from a rail line built during British rule (Fig. 4). 
Bhakkar City belongs to Bhakkar Tehsil, which is one of four tehsils comprising 
Bhakkar District.20 Bhakkar was a tehsil of neighboring Mianwali District until 1982, 
when it received its own district status. This provided the area with provincial 
representation and an increased population alongside it as people with social and business 
ties to the new district gradually shifted there. The population of the city itself increased 
from 42,000 in 1981 to 69,000 at the time of the last nationwide census in 1998 and is 
projected to be approaching 150,000 today.21 The city is largely structured by its 
mohallas, which have grown in a north-south pattern along the Mianwali-Layyah rail line 
that now divides the city in half. Parallel to the rail line on its western side is the city’s 
main bazaar, its densest and most expensive residential area. Mohallas in this part of 
town were built as early as British rule and remain in high demand due to their central 
location and the reluctance of their residents to leave intergenerationally occupied areas. 
The population density and property prices of mohallas decline as they expand outward 
from the bazaar. 
While Islamabad’s master plan organizes space down to a small scale, mohallas 
develop gradually and contextually. As Hafiz explained it to me, “Suppose I have a  
specific piece of land, I will go and start my house. Then other body will come, then 
other body will come, and it expands. There is no planning for streets, there’s just  
                                                
20 A tehsil is an administrative division in Pakistan that is larger than a city but smaller than a district. 
 
21 Punjab Municipal Development Fund Company, Bhakkar: Punjab Municipal Services Improvement 
Project, 2011. 
  50 
 
Figure 4: Population density map of Bhakkar City (Punjab Municipal Development Fund 
Company, Bhakkar: Punjab Municipal Services Improvement Project: 55.) 
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arrangements. I will spare some space, the other body will spare his space, and so a street, 
or a gali [lane] will emerge from that.” Rather than the central authority of the plan, the 
built environment of a mohalla is formed through negotiations with neighbors to the left, 
right, front, and back, leading to its irregularity (Fig. 5). This process of growth continues 
until the mohalla meets an externally defined perimeter – a main road, a river, another 
mohalla, etc. It is this difference mentioned by Hafiz, between “planning” and 
“arrangements,” that constitutes that between modern and ‘backward’ spaces in Pakistan. 
Bhakkar, then, embodies the inherent contradiction of Islamabad: the past that the state 
simultaneously excludes and desires to include. In the next section, I discuss how the 
state connected Bhakkar to the global economy in order to meet this desire.  
 
Enabling Development in Bhakkar 
 Ayub Khan’s ambition to include the nation in his vision of modernization was 
not limited to building Islamabad. His efforts reached as far as localities such as Bhakkar 
and included the construction of Jhang Road, a provincial road connecting the district to 
larger cities regionally, and from those the rest of the country. Efforts to incorporate 
Bhakkar continued under subsequent national administrations, consisting of additions to 
Bhakkar’s road network that more tightly integrated the district with surrounding cities 
and towns as well as a broader sphere of regional hubs. These efforts also entailed 
Internet access, first made available through dialing into a Network Access Point (NAP) 
built in a neighboring district in 2007, and then a much faster connection through the 
construction of Bhakkar’s own NAP in 2010. At the national level, the state’s  
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Figure 5: Mohalla in Bhakkar City (photo by author 2014) 
 
institutionalization of migrant labor and remittance channels since the 1970s yet further 
facilitated the flows of people, capital, and ideas to and from Bhakkar.22  
As Anwar has shown, as early as Pakistan’s first years of independence, national 
governments have used the provision of infrastructure such as roads and electricity to 
encourage entrepreneurialism, which they believed would contribute to national 
development. In more recent years, the promotion of entrepreneurialism has increasingly 
entailed integration into the global economy. The World Bank, who has strongly 
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influenced Pakistan’s economic policies since the 1980s,23 has been one of the leading 
proponents of this shift. In their 1997 report, The State in a Changing World,24 The 
World Bank prescribes a model for economic growth in which developing countries 
become less providers than facilitators by creating access to global markets for private 
entrepreneurs. In Pakistan, this has translated to increased institutional support for not 
only roads and electricity, but migration, remittance channels, and telecommunications. 
Following from Rose’s work on advanced liberalism, such strategies can be read as a 
more efficient form of state power. Rather than state-led projects, development occurs 
through ensuring access to global economic circuits for private entrepreneurs. In other 
words, while it is true that in terms of the implementation of development, there is, as 
Hafiz put it, “no government” in Bhakkar, Gulshan-e-Madina demonstrates how state 
interventions enable development in the district. 
 
Building Gulshan-e-Madina 
 Gulshan-e-Madina is a 776 kanal housing scheme located along Jhang Road, 
approximately two miles southeast of the city (Fig. 6). Space within its area is organized 
by a master plan, which designates locations for its amenities and organizes them in a 
rectangular pattern. Gulshan-e-Madina is surrounded by a boundary wall and entered 
through a single gate that is patrolled by armed guards. The gate opens to the main 
boulevard, which leads to a large park at the center of the scheme. To the east of the park 
is a school and a commercial area consisting of 200 shops, and to the west of the park is a 
                                                
23 Zaidi, Issues in Pakistan’s Economy. 
 
24 The World Bank, World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997). 
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mosque and space for a yet to be built hospital. The residential area makes up the largest 
portion of the scheme and traces the perimeter of the wall, consisting of 600 plots that 
range in size from 10 marlas to 2 kanals.25   
 
 
Figure 6: Gulshan-e-Madina’s master plan 
 
To be sure, Gulshan-e-Madina resembles ‘gated communities’ and ‘fortified 
enclaves’ associated with social segregation in the US as well as elsewhere.26  At the 
same time, walled cities and neighborhoods have their own history in South Asia, dating 
                                                
25 10 marlas equals one-half of a kanal. 
 
26 Setha Low, Behind the Gates: Life, Security, and the Pursuit of Happiness in Fortress America (New 
York: Routledge, 2003); Teresa P R Caldeira, City of Walls (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2000). 
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back to 16th century Mughal rule.27 But what I would like to emphasize here is that 
Gulshan-e-Madina is part of a historical process of transitioning from a ‘backward’ to a 
modern nation in Pakistan. This is captured perhaps no more clearly than in the reasoning 
of Hafiz and his partners themselves. As Osman, who I discuss more below, explained to 
me: “My wish was a clean society with good security, good education, good mosque – an 
overall ideal residential environment, just like the neat and clean environment in big 
cities like Lahore and Islamabad. We admired that environment. We thought that we 
could make such a society as we had a lot of land and also invested a lot.” While it might 
appear archetypal, Osman’s view of an “ideal residential environment” is structured by a 
specific path to national development in Pakistan. In what follows, I discuss the role of 
the global economy in enabling development in Bhakkar.  
The coming together of the project was contingent upon Bhakkar’s integration as 
a district as well as regionally, nationally, and even internationally. The idea to develop a 
housing scheme in Bhakkar started with Youssef, who was working as a commission 
agent for a local fruit and vegetable market before the project began in 2004. A year 
earlier, Youssef had visited family who were living in a housing scheme in Gujranwala, a 
large industrial city in northern Punjab. At the time, Youssef was considering investing in 
a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) under which he would develop a fruit and vegetable 
market to be sold to the local government. After returning from the trip, his plan 
broadened to constructing a housing scheme next to the market similar to the one he 
visited in Gujranwala. He brought the idea to his former professor and longtime mentor 
and friend, Qasim. While Qasim was skeptical about the feasibility of a formal fruit and 
                                                
27 William J Glover, Making Lahore Modern: Constructing and Imagining a Colonial City (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2008). 
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vegetable market in an area like Bhakkar, much less a housing scheme, he nevertheless 
introduced Youssef to Rashad, Bhakkar’s Member of the Provincial Assembly (MPA), 
whose brother-in-law owned a large landholding on the outskirts of the city. Youssef was 
initially only interested in purchasing several hundred kanals for his plan, but Rashad, 
who divided his time between Bhakkar and the provincial capital of Lahore as an MPA, 
encouraged him to expand his idea yet further and purchase the entire 842 kanals: “I told 
them that we would make it as good as Lahore or any other big city of Pakistan,” Rashad 
recalled to me. As Youssef lacked the capital for such a large investment, Qasim 
recruited two more investors for the project: Hafiz, a local-level politician and 
businessman, and Osman, whose family owned a regional chain of sweet shops – both of 
whom lived in the neighboring town of Darya Khan. Importantly, the project’s sixth and 
silent partner is Osman’s brother-in-law, who contributed to Osman’s side. This partner is 
a Pakistani national who has been working in Saudi Arabia for the past several decades, 
and without whose contribution the purchase of the 842 kanals would not have been 
possible. It was these flows of people, capital, and ideas, ranging from Youssef’s trip to 
Gujranwala to the remittance transfer that was necessary to procure such a large 
landholding, that undergirded the launch of the project. 
 Having exhausted almost all of their capital to purchase the land, the partners 
relied on a series of risky strategies to complete the project. What I hope to highlight here 
is not just the unlikely success of these strategies, but also the way in which they 
depended upon various flows in and out of the city. Through Rashad’s connections in 
Lahore, the partners hired an architect from the provincial capital to design Gulshan-e-
Madina’s gate and master plan. With their remaining funds, they decided to construct the 
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gate and boundary wall first (Fig. 7); as Gulshan-e-Madina fronted Jhang road, this 
would advertise the housing scheme to anyone passing through the city along it. Indeed, 
this strategy attracted enough initial plot sales to clear and flatten the land, excavate the 
roadways, and install sewerage lines and a water tower. However, plot sales, and 
accordingly development, stalled after this point. Again faced with a shortage of capital, 
the partners decided to invest what remained in the construction of the park and an 
advertising campaign. Needing to make the park, in Youssef’s words, “special,” they 
hired another architect from Lahore. This US-educated architect had previously worked  
 
 
Figure 7. Gulshan-e-Madina’s main entrance gate (photo by author 2014) 
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for Bahria Town, and his final design included a number of extravagant features, 
including a pendulum ride, a miniature train, and an electronic waterfall (Fig. 8). The 
advertising team, also hired from Lahore, was brought in to promote the housing scheme 
in the local area. Their services included radio and television advertisements featuring a 
jingle entitled ‘Your Dream House’ that were broadcasted to nearby villages, towns, and 
cities. These strategies – the construction of the gate, boundary wall, and park, as well as 
the radio and television ads – helped publicize and establish the credibility of the housing 
scheme, leading to the sale of the remaining plots. Moreover, in differing ways, they 
relied on various economic circuits connecting Bhakkar regionally and nationally.  
 
 
Figure 8: Gulshan-e-Madina’s park (photo by author 2014) 
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But while hired professionals were integral to Gulshan-e-Madina’s success, the 
partners emphasized to me that many of the ideas for the housing scheme’s design came 
from them. Upon pursuing this point, I learned that most of these ideas were linked to the 
partners’ experiences beyond Bhakkar. For example, Rashad attributed his contributions 
to his constant travel as an MPA: “These electricity poles in the boulevard, I stole that 
design from Islamabad” he jokingly told me. And such trips span national borders as 
well. When I inquired about the housing scheme’s greenery, Youssef explained:  
I have this craving for travelling and whatever I observe I try to apply all that 
here. I visited Dubai in 2011, I went there just to observe. They’ve made a China 
Town there which I really admired. They made beautiful housing societies in that 
desert. There is not much water there but they’ve made it very green – it looks 
very beautiful. That’s why after every six months, whenever it’s the season, I do 
some planting all over the town. Also, whenever some house construction is about 
to complete, I visit the house owner or call him to my office and motivate him to 
keep his house as green as the other people. The 10-foot gap between the road and 
house is to be filled with greenery. This motivates people and mashallah they 
follow my guidance. 
 
Notably, Bhakkar’s NAP has also played an important role in the movement of 
ideas. Since the completion of Gulshan-e-Madina, Youssef has become a housing 
developer, constructing homes in the housing scheme and selling or renting them to 
residents (Fig. 9). When I asked him where he learned to design houses, he simply 
replied, “Internet.” Living and sitting in one of these houses at the time of our interview, I 
asked him to elaborate: 
First of all, if you want to get a map, Bahria Town has uploaded a lot of maps on 
the Internet. And also you can find a lot of general maps for houses according to 
your dimensions. Then if you talk about interior, what I’ve done there in your 
bedroom with the LCD placement, I replicated it from an idea I saw on the 
Internet. The set up in your TV Lounge is also copied from Internet. I saw it and 
guessed that it would look good here. The TV Lounge set up in the neighboring 
house is in a triangular shape, some portion is on this wall and some on the other. 
It was as it is on the Internet and I applied it here. I tell the carpenter about the 
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idea, he applies it, and we get the desired result. I show them pictures and explain 
them in detail. I’ve copied this roof top from the Internet as well. 
 
 
Figure 9: House designed by Youssef (photo by author 2014) 
 
Even for professionally trained architects in Bhakkar, the Internet is a cornerstone 
of their work. Operating his own firm in the city since 2005, Labib has designed 
approximately half of the houses in Gulshan-e-Madina. Labib told me that most of these 
clients bring him downloaded images of houses they wish to replicate in part or entirely. 
If this is not the case, Labib has his own portfolio, consisting of some of his own designs, 
but also others that he downloaded. These downloaded images come from regional 
websites where software-generated designs or actual photos of houses can be found. The 
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websites are based out of Pakistan’s and India’s larger cities, offering access to house 
designs that are both from larger cities and meet local preferences.  
Labib also relies on the Internet when his client’s demands exceed his individual 
skillset. While attending school and working in various cities, Labib established 
relationships with numerous colleagues in the construction sector. These colleagues have 
their own networks, and each member of the broader network has an area of expertise – 
planning, engineering, interior decorating, etc. Over email, they become enlisted in one 
another’s jobs as needed, supplementing their earnings with cuts from these projects. If 
the required service cannot be provided in this manner, they hire a freelancer through a 
regional online work platform. Like the movement of people through paved roads, 
passports, and visas, then, the movement of maps, images, and expertise through the 
Internet has played a central role in Gulshan-e-Madina’s development.  
In terms of the implementation of development, there is indeed “no government” 
in Bhakkar. However, these stories illustrate how the state’s efforts to connect Bhakkar to 
the global economy have enabled development in the district. It is through access to these 
economic circuits that the entrepreneurs discussed above produce state power in Bhakkar.  
 
Conclusion 
  As an entrepreneurial venture, Gulshan-e-Madina is undoubtedly impressive: the 
partners recognized a market and exploited it with limited capital and expertise. But what 
I would like to emphasize is that this effort reconfigures state power in Bhakkar. That is, I 
view Gulshan-e-Madina as belonging to a larger process of development in Pakistan to 
which the postcolonial state’s legitimacy is bound. Moreover, I have tried to draw 
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attention to numerous moments that were both crucial to Gulshan-e-Madina’s 
development and made possible by the state’s integration of Bhakkar as a district as well 
as regionally, nationally, and internationally. I see the Pakistani state in this instance as 
not merely adapting to globalization, but acting upon an increasingly spatialized 
economy in order to enable development in Bhakkar.
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CHAPTER IV 
 
COUNTER-CONDUCT IN THE MOHALLAS 
Out of curiosity, I asked Labib if he ever built houses in mohallas: 
 
Yes, a lot. The people living there are emotionally attached to those places as their 
fathers and forefathers lived there, so they don’t want to leave those houses, even 
if they have plots in planned societies. But some of them do want a change in the 
construction style. It’s very strange to see a modern house in a mohalla. I can take 
you to a few houses I have built in mohallas, and you will find it quite amazing to 
see modern houses in such places. 
 
Typically, houses in mohallas are built in what Labib called the “traditional” style, or a 
straight line or L-shape with each room opening to the outside.1 By contrast, every house 
Labib has built in Gulshan-e-Madina is a kothi (bungalow), with each room sharing a 
common roof – this is what Labib referred to as a “modern” house. While half of Labib’s 
clients live in Gulshan-e-Madina, the other half live in the city’s mohallas. 
The next day, I met Labib at his office, and we drove to a kothi that he had built in 
a nearby mohalla. We carefully navigated the mohalla’s dirt roads, which were bordered 
by open drains and just wide enough to accommodate our vehicle. On the other side of 
the drains were brick walls, and beyond those were houses constructed of the same 
material. Then we reached our destination, marked by a large, bright white, cement wall 
that differentiated the house from the traditional ones on either side of it. One of the 
house’s residents, Majid, received us at the gate and lead us into the front yard. From the 
yard, I saw the house’s façade. Like the house’s boundary wall, the house itself was 
bright white, and similar the other houses designed by Labib, this house was 
                                                
1 Surrounding this style of house with a boundary wall facilitates the observation of purdah (preventing 
interaction between the women of the household and unfamiliar males). For a more extensive discussion of 
traditional built environments in Pakistan, especially how they relate to gender, see Anita M. Weiss, Walls 
Within Walls: Life Histories of Working Women in the Old City of Lahore (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1992). 
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characterized by modernist features, such as large windows, symmetrical and rectangular 
ornamentation, and concrete canopy.  
Majid had lived in the mohalla his entire life with his four brothers, three sisters, 
and their parents. As he and his brothers got older and planned to get married and start 
families of their own, there was a need to expand their living space. In 2010, they began 
the process of demolishing their traditional house and constructing a kothi. When I asked 
Majid why they decided to build a kothi in their mohalla rather than shift to Gulshan-e-
Madina, he replied: 
Because it’s our need. Because we are four brothers, we have to build a new 
house here, or there, or somewhere, so we decided we should build a house here, 
because it’s safe from many things. We born here in this mohalla, we are living 
like a family in this street, so we trust these people too much than another. 
Because in the housing colony system or town system, only people knew 
themself, they don’t know anything about their neighbors. So, we have a lot of 
time here. 
 
Majid’s view of living in a mohalla differed from that which I had heard from residents 
of Gulshan-e-Madina, many of whom had shifted to the housing scheme from the city’s 
mohallas. While both felt that they were improving, for Majid this meant constructing a 
kothi in his mohalla, rather than doing so in Gulshan-e-Madina.  
In this chapter, I suggest that constructing a kothi in a mohalla constitutes a form 
of resistance to state power. While building a modern house in a mohalla derives from 
the sphere of development discourse in Pakistan, it also transforms that discourse and, in 
doing so, puts that discourse’s natural appearance into question. In the next section, I 
discuss Foucault’s concept of counter-conduct, which he viewed as resistance to power 
that nevertheless was structured by power itself. Following that, I provide more insight 
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into contending discourses of development in the city, which I argue demonstrates the 
limits of state power in the area. 
 
Counter-Conduct and Resistance 
Foucault argued that “[p]ower is exercised only over free subjects, and only 
insofar as they are free.” Freedom as it is conceived here is understood not as an innate 
human nature constrained by external repression, but “a field of possibilities in which 
several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments, may be realized.” 
The exercise of power, then, is “a way in which certain actions may structure the field of 
other possible actions.”2  
Governmentality was a concept developed by Foucault to describe how power 
operated through the governing of autonomous individuals. Governmentality refers to the 
conduct of conduct, or the conducting of individuals as well as those individuals’ 
conduction of themselves. For Foucault, it is this distance that characterizes the conduct 
of conduct that makes power both more potent and more vulnerable to transformation. 
Foucault viewed such transformations as resistance, or what he labeled ‘counter-
conduct,’ which he described as “the will not to be governed thusly, like that, by these 
people, at this price.”3 One of the examples Foucault uses to introduce the concept of 
counter-conduct is resistance to Christian pastoral power in the sixteenth century.4  This 
ranged from Christian communities that attempted alternative forms of social 
                                                
2 Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” in Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 
ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Second (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983): 221. 
 
3 Michel Foucault, The Politics of Truth, ed. Sylvère Lotringer (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2007): 75. 
 
4 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978. 
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organization to more personal and private practices such as asceticism, mysticism, and 
scripture reading. Foucault viewed these acts as destabilizing pastoral power by 
challenging the hierarchy through which Christianity was typically practiced.  
Crucially, such acts of resistance were internal to the form of power they opposed: 
“[This] struggle was not conducted in the form of absolute exteriority, but rather in the 
form of the permanent use of tactical elements that are pertinent in the anti-pastoral 
struggle, insofar as they fall within, in a marginal way, the general horizon of 
Christianity.”5 As Arnold Davidson helpfully clarifies:  
The fundamental elements of the counter-conduct analyzed by Foucault are not 
absolutely external to the conduct imposed by Christian pastoral power. Conduct 
and counter-conduct share a series of elements that can be utilized and re-utilized, 
re-implanted, re-inserted, taken up in the direction of reinforcing a certain mode 
of conduct or of creating and re-creating a type of counter-conduct.6  
 
Counter-conduct is thus simultaneously inscribed in power relations and 
establishes unforeseen lines of force between and within individuals. Such 
transformations create new subjectivities that open up new possibilities for action. By 
broadening the field of possible action, these acts constitute resistance insofar as they put 
into question power’s natural appearance. In the next section, I show how state power is 
contested in Bhakkar through conceptions of development that differ from official 
discourses. While these practices derive from development discourse itself, they bring the 
normativity of that discourse into relief merely through their existence.  
 
 
 
                                                
5 Ibid., 215. 
 
6 Arnold I. Davidson, “In Praise of Counter-Conduct,” History of the Human Sciences 24, no. 4 (2011): 27. 
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Development and Its Limits 
 Abbudin shifted to the housing scheme in 2012. He was born in the city and 
raised in a mohalla. He left Bhakkar to attend university in Faisalabad, a large city in 
northern Punjab, and after that he lived in England for eight years while earning a 
medical degree. Upon returning to the city, he took a job at a local hospital and 
constructed his home in Gulshan-e-Madina. When I asked Abbudin why he relocated, he 
replied, “This is part of just, you can say, natural development – basic needs, basic 
requirements. That’s why my family moved from that place to this place.” I asked 
Abuddin to tell me more about the differences between living in a mohalla and living in 
Gulshan-e-Madina: 
20 years ago, where I was born, everything looks same. But this time, if I visit 
that area, I really feel very sad. That all those people are living the same life, there 
is no change in their quality of life. They are living the same era, 20 years ago. 
The roads or street networks are the same, very poor quality sanitation work. So it 
means, this is change. I think this is basic needs, basic needs. That 20 years ago 
you were living in that area, that was right. But this time, I think it’s very difficult 
that you live there. 
 
 Abbudin’s associations of Gulshan-e-Madina with development and the city’s 
mohallas with ‘backwardness’ are consistent with the state’s discourse of development in 
Pakistan and therefore did not surprise me. According to this view, the traditional forms 
of sociality that structure mohallas, such as family, religion, or ethnicity, are remnants 
from the past that prevent Pakistan from transitioning from a ‘backward’ to a modern 
nation. What did surprise me during my fieldwork in Bhakkar, though, was the extent to 
which this discourse was contested in the area.  
 When I asked Hazim, who works in Gulshan-e-Madina and lives in a mohalla in 
the city, what he thought of the housing scheme, he replied, “That is a jungle . . . 
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Whenever guests visit us we take them to Gulshan-e-Madina for a visit. But it’s good for 
tourism, city is best for residence.” Hazim is one of four brothers, of which three are 
married (including him) and one is engaged. The brothers, their wives, and the children 
of each couple live in the house, which is six marlas. Hazim explained that his family’s 
living arrangement meets their needs: without the brothers sharing the cost of the rent, 
they couldn’t afford to live in the house; everything is conveniently located, and even the 
children can get what they need on their own, as the neighbors are known and trusted; it’s 
easier for the wives to attend functions out of town, such as weddings or funerals, as the 
other wives will keep the house running; their relatives are close by, and everyone can 
gather quickly and easily for social events.  
Similarly, Asad, who previously worked in Gulshan-e-Madina, told me that he 
preferred to live in his village, which is located on the outskirts of the city and where he 
was born. Making many of the same points as Hazim, he added that his home is bigger 
than most of those in Gulshan-e-Madina. Additionally, whereas the housing scheme 
forbids farm animals, he keeps several cows at his house, which produce 30 liters of milk 
per day that is used to provide dairy products for his family. While for Abbudin shifting 
to the housing scheme meets his “basic needs,” for Hazim and Asad doing so would have 
precisely the opposite effect. 
 
Contending Discourses of Development 
Over the past decade or so, people in the city have been building kothis in 
mohallas (Fig. 10). When I asked them why they did so, they would often tell me that 
they were inspired by the houses built in Gulshan-e-Madina. Indeed, the development of 
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the housing scheme started a housing transformation in the city, consisting not just of the 
emergence of approximately one dozen legal and illegal housing schemes, but also the 
increasing construction of modern houses in the traditional urban fabric. 
 
 
 Figure 10: Kothi built in a mohalla in Bhakkar City (photo by author 2015) 
 
Majid was born in the city but educated in Islamabad and then Egypt. He now 
works for a local government organization. In their mohalla, his family’s house is the 
only kothi. When I asked Majid why his family built the house, he told me: “Because we 
are improving. And Alhamdulillah my family is all educated, so we want to look different 
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than other.” For Majid and his family, constructing a kothi means that they too are 
improving. But importantly, for them, improvement requires remaining in their mohalla.  
Majid told me that several weeks prior to us speaking, his neighbor passed away 
just before reaching his home from a religious function. As the man had no family in the 
area, his neighbors, who Majid described as the man’s “other family,” arranged an 
Islamic burial, which is typically performed by relatives. According to Majid, “If they 
were living in Gulshan-e-Madina, nobody will come to their help.” Majid was likely 
referencing a similar situation that occurred in the housing scheme during my fieldwork, 
in which a man passed away and had to be buried by strangers. Residents of both 
Gulshan-e-Madina and several mohallas I visited had lamented the situation in their 
interviews with me. While Abbudin views shifting to Gulshan-e-Madina as part of a 
natural progression from the past, for Majid, these traditional forms of sociality are a 
constitutive aspect of meeting his “basic needs.” 
Though Majid’s desire for improvement and his conception of what that 
improvement consists of are structured by development discourse in Pakistan, his 
family’s actions nevertheless manifest in a transformation of that discourse. I suggest that 
by building a kothi in their mohalla, Majid’s family destabilizes state power in the city. 
Through constructing a modern house in the traditional urban fabric, they upset the 
binary between housing schemes and mohallas as modern and traditional spaces. Though 
not external to development discourse, such acts still undermine that discourse by calling 
into question its natural appearance. In other words, constructing a kothi in a mohalla 
demonstrates that there is another way to improve. Moreover, this path to development 
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directly contradicts the states prerogative of transitioning from a ‘backward’ to a modern 
nation through eliminating built environments structured by traditional forms of sociality.  
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have argued that constructing kothis in mohallas constitutes an 
act of resistance to state power. Invoking Foucault, I suggest that while such acts derive 
from the sphere of development discourse in Pakistan, they also destabilize that discourse 
through bringing into relief its normativity. That is to say, building modern houses in 
traditional settings expands the field of possibilities in which development may be 
realized, and in a manner that defies the intentions with which the state attempts to 
structure that field. For Majid, development requires remaining in his mohalla, as 
traditional forms of sociality, rather than an impediment to his improvement, are a 
constitutive aspect of meeting his “basic needs.”
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 In the summer of 2015, Karachi experienced a heat wave during which 
temperatures reached as high as 113°F, leading to the deaths of at least 1,200 people.1 
The effect of rising temperatures was compounded by its occurrence during Ramadan, 
when most of Pakistan’s population was fasting. Even more significantly, the experience 
of the heat wave was worsened by the energy and water shortages have characterized the 
country’s infrastructure in recent years. As the corpses accumulated in Karachi’s streets, 
locally-based international NGO Edhi Foundation –  a provider of a plethora of services 
in the provincial capital, including medical treatment, hospital transportation, and corpse 
disposal – found itself overwhelmed. Within days of the beginning of the heat wave, Edhi 
Morgue had reached its capacity, with hundreds of unclaimed corpses still arriving. 
Wrapped in white clothes bearing Edhi’s name, the corpses were eventually lined end to 
end in large trenches dug in Edhi Graveyard, and they became symbolic of the state’s 
lack of capacity.  
When CNN reporter Saima Mohsin asked Edhi Foundation’s founder, Abdul 
Sattar Edhi, if he had been in touch with the government, he replied, “What government? 
There is no government. The people are the government. I am the government.”2 The 
statement aptly captured the sentiments of many people in Pakistan, and it dominated 
social media for several days. But interestingly, Edhi’s statement also captures the 
                                                
1 “Why Did so Many Die in Karachi’s Heatwave?,” BBC News, July 2, 2015, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33358705. 
 
2 CNN, “Pakistan’s Heat Wave: Burying the Unknown,” 2015, 
http://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2015/06/29/pakistan-heatwave-burial-of-unknowns-mohsin-
pkg.cnn/video/playlists/pakistan-heat-wave/. 
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argument of this thesis, which is that state power in Pakistan increasingly relies upon the 
efforts of those outside of the state apparatus.  
 Considering the event described above, it would be difficult to make the case for a 
‘strong’ state in Pakistan characterized by coherence and autonomy. But in this thesis, I 
have attempted to identify a different form of state power, one in which the actions of 
Edhi Foundation during the Karachi heat wave suggest a different, but nevertheless 
existing form of rule. While Edhi Foundation’s work during the heatwave makes it clear 
that there is “no government” in Karachi, it also provided the very services that the state 
was expected, but failed, to deliver. That is to say, though Edhi Foundation revealed the 
lack of the state’s presence in Karachi, such efforts are also key to sustaining state rule in 
the city. From this view, state power must be considered beyond the actions deployed by 
the state apparatus and according to statelike processes and practices that contribute to a 
national order, regardless of where they trace back to. 
 In this thesis, I have used housing schemes as an entry point to examine this 
problem in greater depth. Viewed as integral to national development since Pakistan’s 
First Five-Year Plan, the construction of housing schemes has been inextricably linked to 
state power. And yet, few resources have been committed to the development of housing 
schemes by the national government; rather, these projects are developed in an 
entrepreneurial manner and by an array of actors. While this process of developing 
housing schemes is a dispersed and heterogeneous one, I argue that this is also how 
development in Pakistan ‘really works.’ Turning to my case study, I explored this process 
of development in the rural, ‘backward’ district of Bhakkar. Similar to Pakistan’s larger 
cities, the development of Gulshan-e-Madina was an entrepreneurial effort. However, key 
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to making this effort possible in Bhakkar was the state’s integration of the district into 
various global economic circuits. By tracking how the group of entrepreneurs behind 
Gulshan-e-Madina’s development made use of these circuits, I showed how the state 
enabled development in Bhakkar. Finally, I concluded with a discussion of the limits of 
state power in Bhakkar. While the emergence of Gulshan-e-Madina inspired the 
development of approximately a dozen legal and illegal housing schemes in the area, it 
also led to the construction of kothis in mohallas. Invoking Foucault, I argued that the 
building of modern houses in the traditional urban fabric constitutes a form of resistance 
to state power. While not external to development discourse, such actions call that 
discourse’s natural appearance into question by upsetting the binary between housing 
schemes and mohallas as modern and traditional spaces.   
 This project has not been an effort to determine whether the Pakistani state is a 
‘strong’ or a ‘weak’ one, but rather to better understand how state power in the country 
‘really works.’ While heterogeneity and unpredictability are typically associated with 
‘failed’ states, I have argued that such valuations rely upon normative conceptions of 
what states ‘should’ be that obscure the operation of statehood in numerous settings. In 
Pakistan, I have suggested that such disaggregation is characteristic of state rule.  
 
A Genealogy of Housing Schemes 
 This thesis has discussed the array of actors contributing to the construction of 
housing schemes in Pakistan. The military, bureaucratic organizations, private developers 
and more are all deeply invested in the development of these projects. While I have 
argued that this is how state power ‘really works’ in Pakistan, a larger question remains: 
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What are the conditions within which this heterogeneous group of actors are compelled to 
contribute to national development in Pakistan? Though I have linked these efforts to 
state power, the creation of that link itself requires further investigation.  
A genealogy of housing schemes in Pakistan would explore the grounds upon 
which such projects acquire seemingly normative force in the country. To what extent is 
this grounded in colonial history; for example, the construction of housing schemes as 
exemplary milieus by British rulers? How does this colonial history interact with 
contemporary features of Pakistani society, such as high investments in property due to 
the prohibition of interest bearing deposits under Islamic law? What are the particular 
problems that housing schemes address, and what objectives does addressing them 
achieve? Though these are only preliminary questions, they indicate the depth of the 
points that remain to be addressed.  
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